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Utilizing documents from student organizations including strike committees, the National 
Center For Democratic Students, and the writings of young activists, official commentary, and 
press releases, this study provides a detailed examination of the student movement in Mexico 
during the 1960s. Within the historiography of the student youth movement studies tend to focus 
exclusively on 1968 and the movement’s position within the global counterculture. The product 
of this history is the proliferation of a homogenous understanding of the concerns mobilizing 
youth activists. This study however, attempts to advance previous historiography by expanding 
the scope of the student movement to include more broadly the 1960s. This allows for a greater 
understanding of the forces that radicalized students, illustrating that student activism was driven 
by educational, economic, social, and political concerns, including access to jobs and social 
mobility, demands for social welfare, and the creation of more equitable and democratic society. 
This gained understanding further challenges histories centered on delineating the movement as 
purely cultural or purely a political movement. Rather, when examining the diverse concerns 
radicalizing students, this study illustrates the interconnection between both political and cultural 
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On July 22, 1968 violence broke out in the streets of México City. Rivalries between 
contending secondary schools and local gangs erupted into violent street fights.1 In response, the 
city’s Police Undersecretary made the decision to deploy México’s riot police, the granderos, to 
put an end to the fighting. This decision would have colossal ramifications, as some have argued 
it ignited the 1968 student movement.2 Three days later students organized against the brutality 
of police forces. On July 26, 1968 a march led by the Federación Nacional de Estudiantes 
Técnicos (FNET), the National Federation of Students, merged with a protest directed by the 
Central Nacional de Estudiantes Democráticos (CNED), the National Center of Democratic 
Students. CNED, a more left leaning organization that generally aligned with México’s national 
university, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), gathered in response to the 
violence, as well as to celebrate the anniversary of the 1953 attack on the Moncada army 
barracks in Cuba.3 This time however, the violence, which ensued from the deployment of the 
granderos, resulted in the death of seven protesters along with hundreds of others who were 
injured.4 
 In the wake of this violence students from UNAM and the Politechnical Institute joined 
together in a general strike, provoking the closure of all of México City schools.5 This coalition 
between UNAM and Politech reflected an unexpected alliance. UNAM was a prestigious 
university which attracted aspiring business elite and politicians, while the Politech students 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Elaine Carey, Plaza of Sacrifices: Gender, Power, and Terror in 1968 Mexico (Albuquerque: University of New 
Mexico, 2005), 40; George Katsiaficas, The Imagination of the New Left: A Global Analysis of 1968 (Boston: South 
End Press, 1987), 47. 
2 Carey, 39. 
3 Katsiaficas, 47. 
4 Ibid, 47. 
5 Carey, 48; Evelyn P. Stevens, Protest and Response in Mexico (Cambridge: The Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, 1974), 199; Katsiaficas, 47. 
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generally came from the middle or working class.6 Despite divergent socioeconomic standing, 
these students united across institutions in a stand against the violent repression of the police 
forces. However, when students refused to evacuate, campus police entered with bazookas and 
occupied UNAM, as well as, other preparatory schools.7 This violence coupled with the 
government’s continued refusal to allow public negotiations led students to formulate a national 
strike council, Consejo Nacional de Huelga (CNH). On August 8, 1968 representatives from 
schools across the city were elected to the council to organize a city-wide strike.8  
CNH also helped solidify six key demands of the growing student movement. These 
demands included the release of political prisoners arrested during the confrontation with the 
granderos in addition to prisoners taken during earlier union strikes. The second demand called 
for the elimination of Article 145 of the Penal Code, designated to fight internal subversion and 
outlaw rebellious activity. The student’s third and fourth demands were the abolition of the 
granderos and the dismissal of the city’s police chief. The fifth demand was for indemnity to be 
given to the victims injured during the violent confrontations. Finally, students also insisted on 
the administration of justice against all those responsible for the violent repression.9  
Responding to the government’s continued refusal to recognize student concerns and 
negotiate publicly, the strike council organized a rally for October 2, 1968 in the Plaza de Las 
Tres Culturas.10 What began as a relatively routine rally quickly transformed into a site of violent 
repression. Evident in the recollections of numerous participants, the violence that unfolded 
occurred without warning. Participants recall the image of army units as they encircled the crowd 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Carey, 48. 
7 Carey, 49; Katsiaficas, 48; Stevens, 202. 
8 Carey, 62-63; Eric Zolov, Refried Elvis: The Rise of the Mexican Counterculture (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 1999), 120.  
9 Stevens, 48; Zolov, 121. 
10 Katsiaficas, 48. 
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blocking points of exit.11 A helicopter flying overhead descended closer to the crowd before 
firing on the demonstrators. Undercover police, recognizable by the white gloves they wore, also 
began firing at the demonstrators. This storm of bullets devastated the crowd, killing an unknown 
number of civilians. Estimates suggest as many as 400 were killed, whereas the government 
reported only 100 deaths.12 The student movement was largely shattered.  
The Historiography of the Student Movement: Debating the Political Nature of Student 
Activism 
 
This timeline of events leading to the tragic massacre on October 2 constitutes a 
reoccurring metanarrative in the historiography of the student movement in México. Historians 
intent on situating México within the worldwide eruption of revolt in 1968 tend to confine the 
existence of the student movement to a single year, reproducing this narrative, while overlooking 
an extensive history of student activism. Further, placing the student movement within the 
international youth counterculture has generated debate among historians as to whether the 
student movement in México was a political movement or simply cultural, reflective of the 
superficial rebellious nature of the greater counterculture. This debate is important not only for 
how the student movement is to be remembered in history, but also for the perception of student 
actions. Historians suggesting that student activism was purely part of the counterculture, 
reducing student motivations to a mere trend. Trends consequently are fleeting, something that 
passes as new interests become fashionable. Conversely, recognizing the political nature of the 
movement allows historians to identify a greater engagement with society on a more complex 
level as students critically evaluated social conditions and governmental structures. This 
recognition designates students as political actors within México. Ultimately, however, by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Elena Poniatowska, Massacre in Mexico, trans. Helen R. Lane (New York: Viking Press, 1971), 213. 
12 Katsiaficas, 48. 
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focusing strictly on one side of the political-cultural dichotomy, historians inhibit a detailed 
understanding of the forces radicalizing student activism. 
 Within the historiography centered on establishing the cultural form of youth activism, 
historians have focused on illustrating the self-interested nature of specific radicalizing forces to 
dismiss the presence of political content. For example, writing in 1974 Evelyn P. Stevens in her 
book, Protest and Response in México, argues that student mobilization against economic 
matters failed to foster a political movement. In her study Stevens examines the student 
movement in relation to two earlier protests, the Railroad Strike of 1958-1959 and the Doctor’s 
Strike of 1964-1965. The purpose of her study is to understand the government’s response to 
these strikes. Stevens ultimately illustrates a strong correlation between public protest and 
government hostility, challenging assumptions that violent state repression in México was 
atypical. Additionally, by examining the student movement in context with these earlier strikes, 
Stevens depicts México’s youth activists as being driven by socioeconomic concerns. She 
explains that beginning in the 1940s social conditions in México began to deteriorate, as 
industrial growth became the cornerstone of national economic policy.13 Social welfare 
programs such as low-cost housing, food subsidies, social security, and investments in education 
were greatly curtailed, making these benefits unattainable by peasants and the urban poor.14 
These conditions, compounded by reduced wages, fueled public protest, specifically by railroad 
workers and doctors. Stevens explains that in both 1958 and 1964 students stood in solidarity 
with these strikers, providing evidence of a history of student protest prior to 1968.  
This political involvement, Stevens suggests, helped inspire youth activists to protest 
against reduced education spending, encouraging students to initialize their own strike in 1968. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Stevens, 265-266. 
14 Ibid, 265.   
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According to Stevens, while this strike can be seen as economically inspired she does not label 
the students as political actors; rather she emphasizes the cultural aspects of the movement. She 
states that students dismissed norms of “parochialism” and “reserve” for a “Woodstock spirit” 
characterized by profanity and obscenities.15 Since the publication of Protest and Response in 
México, various historians writing after Stevens have referenced her account as illustrating the 
cultural nature of the student movement, ultimately solidifying her argument.16  
Similarly, Donald Mabry, argues that the student movement has generally been localized 
and therefore not of national political importance.17 Focusing his research on the Mexican state 
and the university, Mabry traces earlier occurrences of student protest in 1929 and 1933 
ultimately asserting that early student protests were “self-serving,” generally challenging 
increases in tuition, alterations to graduation requirements, and intensification of exams.18 
However, in 1968 Mabry recognizes a shift towards a more national political criticism.  He 
discounts this political criticism, though, as a mere effort to gain greater popular support for the 
university and, thus, equally self-serving.19 Ultimately, Mabry discredits the political nature of 
the movement because of the students’ failure to generate any meaningful change.  
The student’s apparent “preoccupation” with professional concerns equally emphasized 
the movement’s self-serving character. Writing for the Concise Encyclopedia of México, Jesús 
Vargas Valdez argues that a common concern among students was that school curriculum 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Ibid, 204-208.  
16 Yoram Shapira, “The Impact of the 1968 Student Protest on Echeverria’s Reformism,” Journal of Interamerican 
Studies and World Affairs 19 (Nov 1977): 558; Zolov, 122, 125. 
17 Donald J. Mabry, “The Mexican Government and Student Conflict: An Essay,” in Student Protest: The Sixties 
and After, ed. Gerard J. Degroot (London: Addison Wesley Longman Limited, 1998), 137; Donald J. Mabry, The 
Mexican University and the State: Student Conflicts, 1910-1917 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 
1982).  
18 Mabry, “The Mexican Government and Student Conflict,”134.  
19 Ibid, 137.  
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inadequately prepared students for the professional arena.20 This was reflective of the saturated 
job market, which left an increasing number of graduates unemployed. These professional 
concerns, Valdez acknowledges, did erupt into a larger social movement in response to police 
brutality. However, Valdez contends that the movement remained purely social. Political factions 
such as the Juventud del Partido Comunista and the Maoist movement within México, 
constituted only a “small nucleus” of students, remaining marginalized from the general 
movement.21 Valdez further elaborates that in the wake of the October 2nd massacre students 
were entirely depoliticized, suggesting that by 1969 youth were consumed with drugs, rock n’ 
roll, and the larger hippie movement which characterized the counterculture. Together Stevens, 
Mabry, and Vargas Valdez advance the historiography of the student movement beyond the 
larger metanarrative by suggesting some degree of activism—whether economically driven or 
self-centered—prior to 1968. However, according to these historians, such concerns fail to 
constitute political action. Thus, the political-cultural dichotomy in the historiography of the 
student movement is, in part, perpetuated by differences in how historians define “political.”  
Another trend within the historiography focused on asserting the cultural nature of 
activism, has been for historians to comment on the student movement in relation to a more 
expansive examination of the global counterculture. For example, Jeremi Suri, in his book Power 
and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente, explores how popular protest affected 
foreign policy during the Cold War, arguing that the international protest movement during 1968 
influenced political leaders to assume a policy of détente. Although Suri does not focus directly 
on the student movement in México, his study holds importance for historians who disregard the 
political consciousness of student activists. Suri maintains that despite the vociferous “language 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Jesús Vargas Valdez, “Student Movement of 1968,” in Concise Encyclopedia of Mexico (Abingdon: Taylor & 
Francis Ltd, 2001), 738. 
21 Valdez, 738.   
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of dissent” projected by youth globally; this language was devoid of any political significance.22 
Rather, according to Suri, youth were simply reiterating the words of intellectual elites. To 
suggest that students were mere emulators of intellectuals, however, denies students the capacity 
to be free thinkers and also fails to recognize the students’ own unique, political project. This 
ultimately reduces the political agency of students, devaluing their activism along with the ideals 
promoted by the movement. Further, with little political value attributed to the student 
movement, the possibility of recognizing changes or even responses generated by student 
activism is likely to go unnoticed.  
Forrest D. Colburn in his book, The Vogue of Revolution in Poor Countries, also 
comments on this historiographic debate. Colburn’s study consists of a comparative analysis of 
revolutions in Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East in an attempt to reveal the similarities 
among revolutions taking place in very distinctive national settings.23 However, more relevant to 
the context of this study, Colburn discounts the political activism among intellectuals and 
university students as a mere fascination with revolution, arguing that revolution had become a 
‘vogue” during the 1960s.24 The Left as Colburn seems to suggest promoted a romanticized 
notion of revolutions in Cuba, Vietnam, and China because the revolutions were a “fashion” 
rather than embodying a movement for political change. The political concerns of student 
activists then, according to both Suri and Colburn were shallow and reflected a trend among 
intellectuals rather than a true consciousness.  
Affirming that Suri and Colburn’s assertion holds some truth in the context of the 
Mexican student movement, Luis González de Alba, a former student leader, challenges the 
assumption that participating in the student movement engendered a political consciousness 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente (Cambridge, Mass., 2003), 3. 
23 Forrest D. Colburn, The Vogue of Revolution in Poor Countries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 5.  
24 Colburn, 48. 
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among participants. González de Alba suggests that students were stirred by the excitement of 
rebellion. He writes, “…but what fun was the party, we made the streets ours, the carnival, the 
laziness, the stopped traffic, the chaos…”25 His recollection then is characterized by an 
atmosphere of fiesta and carnival; he celebrates the lackadaisical and disorderly nature of the 
movement that accompanied the student’s takeover of the streets.26 Further, while he does 
acknowledge the existence of serious minded students, his account largely celebrates the 
predominate interest in sexuality, long hair, drugs, and rock n’ roll.27 Ultimately, the recorded 
experience of González de Alba has been utilized by historians attempting to demonstrate the 
countercultural nature of student activism. However, this tendency typifies a common error, 
which is the failure to recognize cultural acts as political statements. This error advances the 
political-cultural dichotomy, inhibiting a more complete understanding of student activism 
during the 1960s. 	  
Collectively these historians have elucidated alternative factors that motivated student 
protest, including educational and professional concerns. These factors help to expand beyond 
the larger narrative of 1968 to illustrate a longer and more complex history of student activism. 
Ultimately, these historians adhere to a constricted definition of political protest as constituting a 
challenge to government structure and policy. Accordingly, they have argued against the political 
nature of the student movement, challenging the idea that economic, self-serving, and cultural 
characteristics of student activism can be considered political.  
Jesús Gutiérrez’s personal account of his involvement as a student activist, challenges the 
previous historiography centered on discrediting the political consciousness of the movement. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Luis Gonzalez de Alba, “La fiesta y la tragedia,” Nexos 189 (September 1993): 27. The various translations within 
this study are my own.   
26 Gonzalez de Alba, 27.  
27 Ibid, 27. 
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Gutiérrez proclaims that his participation with the movement transformed him and other students 
from “naïve nonactors in political life” to individuals intent on fighting for the socialist 
reorganization of México.28 In an attempt to reconcile experiences such as the one lived by 
Gutiérrez with the larger history of the student movement, historians on the other side of the 
historiographical debate have insisted on seeing students as participants in a political movement. 
These historians have largely focused on placing the student movement within the context of the 
New Left. For example, George Katsiaficas writing in 1987 asserts that students were the central 
catalysts for making the New Left a global movement.29 His study, centered on illuminating the 
international connections of the social movements in 1968, is rooted in what he calls global eros 
effects.30 He argues that the Vietnam War, the Cuban Revolution, and anti-imperialism were 
concerns that united students transnationally, representing an instance of the global eros effect. 
United by these concerns, youth activists transformed the New Left into a global movement. 
Further, what he finds most significant was the extent to which the actions of students in 1968 
became political, asserting that economic struggles were transformed into political movements, 
as “self-interests” became “universal interests.”31 He cites increased militancy, boycotts and sit-
ins in Turkey, Scandinavia, and Africa as evidence for the increased politicization.32  
 Katsiaficas’ attention towards Latin America is fairly limited. In his brief discussion of 
México’s student movement Katsiaficas reproduces the metanarrative presented at the outset of 
this introduction. In doing so, his account simply depicts students as acting in response to police 
brutality, failing to recognize other local concerns motivating students. As a consequence, 
México’s student movement becomes homogenous with the larger international movement, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Michael Soldatenko, “Mexico ’68: Power to the Imagination!” Latin American Perspectives 32 (2005): 68.  
29 Katsiaficas, 37. 
30 Ibid, 3. 
31 Ibid, 42. 
32 Ibid, 42. 
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suggesting that youth were largely politicized by concerns with Vietnam and anti-imperialism. 
However, as other historians have illustrated, educational and economic concerns may have 
motivated student protest as well, indicating that international examinations of student protest 
may mask more than they reveal.  
 Eric Zolov offers a different interpretation of the student movement in México locating 
his analysis within the wider context of the New Left. Inspired by Van Gosses who defines the 
New Left in the United States as a “movement of movements,” Zolov insists that historians are 
in need of a revisionist framework for understanding the social movements of the 1960s in Latin 
America.33 He argues that “non-armed” rebellion including both student protest and México’s 
hippy movement equally embody branches of the New Left, along with the more radical armed-
guerrillas.34 Zolov asserts that both forms of protest are “twin facets of diverse and intersecting 
movements.”35 Thus, both armed and non-armed protest can challenge state power and social 
norms. This suggestion that countercultural practices, which defied traditional Mexican 
conventions, should be understood as constituting political action begins to advance previous 
history by incorporating cultural elements within the political sphere.36 
In this context, Zolov labels México’s student movement as being politically motivated, 
illustrated in the student’s “irreverence” for the nation’s political system.37 Zolov recognizes this 
irreverence within the larger narrative of 1968 and the escalation of events that led to the 
massacre on October 2nd.  Student demands for the release of political prisoners and the dismissal 
of Article 145 of the Penal Code reflects a larger challenge to the political system, according to 
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34 Zolov, “Expanding our Conceptual Horizons,” 52.  
35 Ibid, 51. 
36 Zolov, Refried Elvis, 1.  
37 Ibid, 122. 
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Zolov. Thus, by studying student activism in the context of the larger countercultural 
atmosphere, Zolov not only asserts the political nature of the movement, but contends that 
countercultural practices, which others dismissed as superficial rebelliousness, actually need to 
be understood as part of the larger political movement of the New Left.  
In accordance with Katsiaficas and Zolov, Jeffery Gould’s examination of the1968 
student movement in Uruguay, Brazil, and México, similarly situates student activism within the 
New Left. Influenced by social theorist Immanuel Wallerstein, Gould in his article “Solidarity 
Under Siege: Latin American Left, 1968” argues that the New Left posed a political challenge to 
the world capitalist system.38 Students inspired by the New Left in Latin America shared with 
Europeans and North Americans a demand for participatory democracy, social welfare, and a 
general opposition to imperialism, particularly in reference to Vietnam.39 Gould further 
challenges assertions of the superficiality of student protests by providing personal testimonies 
that illustrate a strong political commitment. He quotes one student who claimed that their life 
was entirely changed by participating in the movement.40 A second student Eduard Valle 
stressed, “’68 was a moment of...immense commitment…commitment that I took on with the 
assumption that something…could happen to you.”41 Gould further challenges those who dismiss 
the movement as superficial by also allowing for countercultural practices within the political 
movement. However, unlike Katsiaficas and Zolov, Gould asserts that challenges to social 
norms—like those posed by the counterculture—are not only part of the political movement but 
are a central component to revolution.42 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Jeffery Gould, “Solidarity Under Siege: Latin American Left, 1968,” The American Historical Review 114 (April 
2009): 350. 
39 Gould, 351. 
40 Ibid, 365.  
41 Ibid, 365. 
42 Ibid, 367.   
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Focusing more broadly on the Cold War, Greg Grandin also provides an important 
contribution to the discussion of the New Left. In agreement with Gould, Zolov’s understanding 
of the New left as constituting both “armed” and “unarm” revolutionary activity is in response to 
Greg Grandin’s more militant classification of the New Left as a “will to act.”43 In his book The 
Last Colonial Massacre, Grandin elaborates that the “will to act” is embodied in a continuous 
dialect between revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces, which serve to radicalize and 
polarize everyday life.44 Beginning in 1954 with the U.S. backed overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz, 
Guatemalans from the left became radicalized by the loss of liberal ideals and advancements 
promoted during the October Revolution.45 Correspondingly, a counterinsurgency mobilized in 
response to fears of liberalization and socialist policy, as well as, status anxiety, and racism.46 
Furthering this dialect between revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces was also Cold War 
terror, introduced by the United States as a means for securing a free market empire. Grandin 
argues that terror fueled racist thoughts, incited reaction from the left, and further encouraged 
repressive responses from the counterinsurgency. Ultimately, Grandin illustrates the importance 
of examining the forces radicalizing political actors, and in doing so he also allows for a greater 
attention and understanding of the “human” experience during the Cold War. 
More than simply helping to understand the complexity of radicalization, Grandin’s 
book, The Last Colonial Massacre, also illustrates other important shifts in the historiography of 
the Cold War. For example, he suggests that the Cold War was not simply a contest between 
U.S. democracy and Soviet communism, but rather embodies a challenge to the very meaning of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Greg Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin American in the Cold War (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2004), 15. 
44 Grandin’s study focuses specifically on the experience of Guatemalans.	  
45 In the years immediately following the end of World War II a democratic fervor spread throughout many Latin 
American countries, this trend is referred to as the October Revolution.   
46 Members of the counterrevolution largely consisted of extreme Catholics, anti-communist youth, and those in the 
middle class seeking to advance socially.  
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democracy. He argues that the real legacy of the Cold War was the transformation of an 
understanding of democracy rooted in social equality and social security, to a definition of 
democracy based on hierarchy, personal freedom, and free market ideology.47 This argument 
asserts the centrality of Latin America to the history of the Cold War, demonstrating how 
countries, such as Guatemala, became vital Cold War battlefields. Other historians have similarly 
illustrated the importance of Latin America, arguing that countries including Cuba and 
Argentina, were not simply battlegrounds for the superpower rivalry to play out, but rather were 
independent actors, directly shaping policy and the direction of the Cold War.48 Thus, more 
recent studies have focused on expanding Cold War historiography beyond understandings of the 
conflict as constituting a confined superpower rivalry.  
A beneficial corollary of recognizing the importance of Latin American actors has been 
the increasing emphasis on the transnational character of the Cold War. Transnational elements 
materialize in political and cultural encounters between the United States, the Soviet Union, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 This change occurred as individuals isolated themselves as a means of survival, resulting in the separation of the 
“self and solidarity,” which Grandin states are two central components necessary for liberal democracy. Grandin, 
198.	  	  	  
48 Daniela Spenser, “The Caribbean Crisis: Catalyst for Soviet Projection in Latin America,” in In From the Cold: 
Latin American’s New Encounter with the Cold War, ed. Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser (London: Duke 
University Press, 2008), 104; In this article Daniela Spenser illustrates the influence of Cuba on Soviet policy. The 
Soviet Union, originally intent on sponsoring unarmed revolution, was forced to support Cuba’s militaristic 
campaigns, in an attempt to preserve Soviet influence in Latin America. Had the Soviet Union refused to back Cuba, 
they feared China or worse the United States would gain the upper hand in the region. Spenser argues that the 
decision to support Cuba taxed the Soviet Union’s military budget and also severely hurt relations with the United 
States, deepening tension between the two superpowers. Cuba’s assistance to revolutionary movements in Africa 
and else where also challenged the political posture of the United States. In accordance with Spenser, Thomas 
Blayton similarly strives to elucidate the role of Latin America in the Cold War by illustrating how Mexico was able 
to maintain a degree of independence by remaining neutral. Evidenced in new archival material released by the 
National Security Archive, Blayton argues that Mexico was “Janus faced” at times helping the United States, while 
also expressing support for Cuba. Additionally, Ariel Armony, examines the role of Argentina in the promotion of 
the “Dirty War” against communism and leftist forces within Argentina and also throughout the region. Argentinean 
officials exported both military equipment and counterinsurgency training to various Central American countries 
including Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras. Ariel C. Armony, “Transnationalizing the Dirty War: Argentina in 
Central America,” in In From the Cold: Latin American’s New Encounter with the Cold War, ed. Gilbert M. Joseph 
and Daniela Spenser (London: Duke University Press, 2008), 136;  Thomas Blayton, “Recovering the Memory of 
the Cold War: Forensic History and Latin America,” in In From  the Cold: Latin American’s New Encounter with 
the Cold War. ed. Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser (London: Duke University Press, 2008). 
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various other countries. These encounters or “contact zones” are defined by an exchange of 
ideas, resources, and generally a shared goal.49 For example, Cuba’s assistance to African 
revolutionaries, as well as, the promotion of U.S. counterinsurgency forces in Guatemala, 
provide examples of transnational encounters. However, these encounters are not simply political 
or militaristic, but are cultural as well. Historians seeking to move beyond a diplomatic centered 
history focus more on the cultural aspects of Cold War interactions, illustrating that the 
experience of the cold war for many individuals, extended beyond national borders, and was 
neither exclusively political nor cultural.50  
Moving Beyond Dichotomies: Historicizing the Student Movement  
Much like the larger history of the Cold War, failing to recognize the interconnection 
between political and cultural realms inhibits a complete understanding of student activism 
during the 1960s and the experience within that movement. Advocates of the cultural form of 
youth activism veil the political intent and societal vision promoted by students. While, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Armony, 136.  
50 For example, Eric Zolov’s study of the counterculture in Mexico illustrates how youth participated in 
transnational experiences through the promotion of rock n’ roll and other countercultural interests. Additionally, in 
an essay studying the student attack of the Mexican-North American Cultural Institute in Morelia, Zolov illustrates 
how the institute attempted to create an image of Pan-Americanism through cultural objects. However, in solidarity 
with Cuban revolutionary forces, following the Bay of Pigs, students sought to destroy the institute in rejection of a 
false Pan-Americanism they believed the institute embodied. Similar to the cultural center, the United States also 
sought to engender support for the U.S. through Mexican news sources. Seth Fein in his essay, “Producing the Cold 
War in Mexico: The Public Limit of Covert Communications,” explains how the U.S. through “Project Pedro” 
constructed Mexico’s newsreels in an attempt to control and influence the representation of the U.S. and the world 
more broadly. In both examples cultural objects were employed as a means of advancing the United States’ political 
project. Additionally, Both Zolov and Victoria Langland discuss the transnational popularity of cultural signifiers, 
such as mini-skirts and birth control, as illustrating the changing role of women in terms of sexual promiscuity. 
Participating in these “nontraditional” cultural behaviors represents a political challenge to the place of women in 
society. Ultimately these examples solidify an interconnection between cultural and political realms. Zolov, Refried 
Elvis; “Cuba Si, Yanquis No!” in In From the Cold: Latin American’s New Encounter with the Cold War, ed. 
Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser (London: Duke University Press, 2008), 214-252; Seth Fein, “Producing the 
Cold War in Mexico: The Public Limit of Covert Communications,” in In From the Cold: Latin American’s New 
Encounter with the Cold War, ed. Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser (London: Duke University Press, 2008); 
Victoria Langland, “Birth Control Pills and Molotov Cocktails: Reading Sex and Revolution in 1968 Brazil,” in In 
From the Cold: Latin American’s New Encounter with the Cold War, ed. Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser 
(London: Duke University Press, 2008). 
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historians intent on stressing the student movement’s position within the New Left commonly 
reproduce the metanarrative, confining student activism to 1968. This positioning tends to 
produce an image of a homogenous, international student movement while also naturalizing 
student protest as an expected response to government repression. The following study, however, 
proposes a need to move beyond the dichotomy of political versus cultural to understand the 
forces radicalizing student activism, and also to allow for the inclusion of cultural acts within the 
student’s political project. In order to accomplish this, this study attempts to extend the focus 
beyond 1968 to examine a more expansive history of student activism in México. Ultimately, by 
historicizing the student movement in México during the 1960s this study argues that student 
activism was driven by educational, economic, social, and political concerns, including access to 
jobs and social mobility, demands for social welfare, and the creation of more equitable and 
democratic society.    
Each chapter examines how students articulated their discontent and the different 
radicalizing forces motivating their activism. The first chapter focuses on university centered 
concerns, primarily demands for institutional autonomy from government intrusion. Beginning 
with the 1966 crisis at UNAM, newspaper articles, student publications, and administrative 
commentary reveal that students demanded representation and influence within the university. 
Students desired academic autonomy to create a more expansive curriculum centered less on 
economic concerns and more on the interests of students. Ultimately, this chapter reveals an 
early history of student activism driven by educational matters, thus challenging the larger 1968 
narrative on police brutality as the igniting factor of student activism.  
The second chapter examines discontent over diminishing employment opportunities, 
illustrating how in many respects, student activism reflected a class project intent on securing a 
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middle class identity. For middle and upper class students the prospects of unemployment or 
non-professional employment posed a challenge to their class identity, which was rooted in the 
prestige of professional work. Students, then, were radicalized from discontent developed after 
they left the universities to find work but failed to advance socially, thus illustrating how the 
experience of a loss in social mobility motivated student activism. Further, this chapter studies 
what both students and teachers labeled the undemocratic, aristocraticization of education. 
Stemming from the move towards the privatization of education and increased costs of university 
attendance, students condemned the fact that the quality of one’s education was determined by 
income. Students feared losing access to the social prestige provided by a college education, but 
they were also troubled by the implications of increased tuition costs on the social mobility of the 
lower classes. An expanding middle class was important for their own class identity, as well as, 
the democratic society envisioned by students.  
Inherent in the second chapter is a contradiction existent between the student’s earlier 
class project and an emerging concern for the Mexican people. This inconsistency, however, is 
evidence of the complexity in the evolution of the student’s political concerns and awareness, 
and further accentuates the importance of recognizing the diversity of radicalizing forces.51 As 
chapter three illustrates, in the late 1960s students sought to expand the scope of their movement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Some historians attempting to rationalize the contradictions inherent in the student movement have suggested that 
Mexican students reached out to the popular class as means of strengthening their movement and ensuring its 
continuation. Others rationalize the expansion of the movement’s ideals as a natural progression towards the 
promotion of democracy in Mexico. For example, Gerard Degroot in an introductory essay to a collection of articles 
concerning student protest during the 1960s, suggests that in the West, and even more so in the East, students feel a 
general sense of responsibility to society. He explains that a “turning to the masses” occurred in student movements 
in Iran, France, South Korea, Germany, as well as, Mexico. However, he reasons that violent government repression 
of student activism in countries like Mexico, Iran, and South Korea, occurred once students had successfully gained 
popular support. Gerard J. Degroot, “The Culture of Protest: An Introductory Essay,” in Student Protest: The Sixties 
and After, ed. Gerard J. Degroot (London: Addison Wesley Longman Limited, 1998), 5-7; Mabry,137; “Strike 
Committee of the Faculty of Philosophy: The Mexican Student Movement: Its Meaning and Perspectives,” in 




by demanding greater democracy for all Mexicans. This identification with the popular class 
reflects a broadening of activism as students began to shift away from university centered 
concerns towards a greater attention to the conditions and needs of México’s workers. In 
correlation to the concern for equal access to education, students were also critical of the 
government’s lack of social spending. Diminished social spending worsened the standards of 
living for many Mexicans. Sources from various political organizations, CNED, the Strike 
Committee, and North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA)52 reveal that students 
demanded increased wages, tax reform, and reductions in foreign investments as a means for 
uplifting the standard of living for the Mexican people and reducing inequality.  
Angered by economic and social inequality, students felt motivated to challenge 
México’s single-party political system, led by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). The 
final chapter explains how activists challenged México’s concentration of political power within 
the executive branch, the ineffectiveness of unions, and the repression of oppositional forces. 
Understanding that the lower classes would continue to be marginalized in the absence of 
political representation, students called for the formation of a political party for the masses to 
help restore democracy in México and diminish the influence of the bourgeoisie. Together these 
chapters strive to historicize student activism and move beyond analyzing the movement in terms 
of either a political or cultural project. Ultimately this study hopes to provide a more detailed 
understanding of student activism in México during the 1960s, illustrating that students were 
radicalized by a combination of economic, social, and political concerns.53   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 NACLA was originally formed to investigate and report on the relationship between the United States and the 
Americas. NACLA provides an example of a transnational contact zone, initiated during the Cold War, between the 
U.S. and Latin Americans.   
53	  The role of gender in youth radicalization is limited in this study. Both women and men were diligent activists and 
for many women involvement within the movement represented both a cultural and political challenge to traditional 
gender norms. However, within the structure of the movement gender norms were also often replicated—placing 
men in the majority of leadership positions and assigning women to tasks of preparing meals. Deborah Cohen and 
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A Brief Comment on Source Material  
 
This study has relied on various primary source documents from student publications, 
strike councils, CNED, as well as newspaper articles and presidential commentary. These 
documents include both translated works and works in their original Spanish form. As a result of 
the historical concentration on the later student youth movement, the bulk of these sources are 
from 1968. These sources, however, when examined carefully illustrate that students were 
commenting on an array of conditions in México beyond reactions to police brutality. Central to 
this study has been the work of former student activists, most importantly Pablo Gonzales 
Casanova. Published after the height of student protest in 1968, Gonzales Casanova’s book 
Democracy in México has provided deep insight into the social demands of the student 
movement. Equally important was the CNED publication on democratic reform within 
education. This publication captures student disaffection over economic development and the 
supremacy of foreign business interests within México.   
Contributions from a number of secondary sources have also been central for developing 
a foundation from which to understand the context of student activism. In particular, Donald 
Mabry’s work on the relationship between student affairs and the Mexican government helps to 
elucidate concerns over university autonomy and the 1966 UNAM crisis. Focusing on economic 
development in México, David Lorey offers an important explanation of the impact of economic 
development on enrollment and job availability. Also to supplement Gonzales Casanova’s study, 
Judith Hellman provides a leftist critique of conditions in México, focusing particularly on the 
social state of México.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Lessie Jo Frazier’s essay,  “Defining the Space of Mexico ’68: Heroic Masculinity in the Prison and ‘Women’ in the 
streets,” provides a detailed discussion of gender and youth activism.  
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CHAPTER 1 University Centered Activism and Demands for Autonomy  
 
“It is not possible to continue tolerating the control of the university by a small coterie of men who are the 
sole managers of the money of the people and the consciousness of the youth.” –El Sol de México54  
 
 Andrés Montaño Sánchez, a dedicated mathematics student, boarded the bus every 
morning at five a.m. for a two-hour ride to campus. His bus ride to and from school totaled four 
hours and cost his parents twelve pesos every day.55 Most students, like Andrés, were dependent 
on reliable and affordable bus transportation to and from school. Consequently, proposed rate 
increases, announced in August of 1958 angered students.56 Privately owned bus companies 
sought to cover repairs, while also accruing a large profit margin by raising bus rates.57 In 
response students began to mobilize in opposition to the unaffordable rate increases. On August 
22, 1958 students from the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) occupied and 
burned a local bus terminal, and absconded with over sixty buses.58 In the days following 
students from the Instituto Politécnico Nacional, as well as, teachers and workers aligned with 
UNAM students, started participating in mass demonstrations. However, by August 30th the 
coalition feared military intervention and began negotiating with the bus companies and the 
government. Students agreed to a temporary suspension on the rate increases in exchange for a 
transportation commission to ensure improved service while also providing the students with 
representation.59   
 Mobilization against unjust bus fares provides an early example of student activism 
rooted in educational concerns, particularly access to education. This example of student 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 “University Chaos,” El Sol de Mexico (April 28, 1966), in Political Power in Latin America: Seven 
Confrontations, ed. Richard R. Fagen and Wayne A. Cornelius Jr. (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1970), 329. 
55 Ibid, 27.  
56 The bus system was central, in part, because UNAM was removed from the city center to the outlying districts.  
57 Mabry, The Mexican University and the State, 210. 
58 Ibid, 210. 
59 Ibid, 211-212. 
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organization is illustrative of the majority of activism prior to 1968, which stemmed most 
commonly from university matters, a fact that is often overlooked in the larger narrative of 
student activism in 1968 México.60 The purpose of this chapter is to provide greater depth to our 
understanding of the student youth movement by recognizing the educational concerns that 
mobilized youth to participate in protests. In contrast to previous historiography this discussion 
illustrates that educational concerns were in fact intricately linked to the formation of a political 
consciousness for students. Drawing attention first to the crisis at UNAM in 1966, sources 
including newspaper articles and a written reflection from UNAM graduate, Rafael Segovia, 
reveal that changes to education requirements, entrance exams, and course content ignited 
student mobilization against the rector of UNAM.  
Secondly, this chapter examines demands for academic freedom within the University as 
a radicalizing force, relying particularly on publications from Central Nacional de Estudiantes 
Democráticos (CNED).  Continuously from 1966 through 1968 students found themselves in a 
struggle for autonomy from university administrators, the state, and business interests, repeatedly 
organizing to demand greater representation within university governance, as well as, academic 
freedom. Students desired the freedom to choose from an array of classes that would foster 
individuality, while also creating a well-rounded citizenry. In order to accomplish this, students 
envisioned a college education, which served the public good, rather than business interests by 
providing courses rich in culture, political thought, and scientific investigation. Students also 
adamantly protested the violent denial of institutional autonomy from state intervention during 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 In 1920, following the conclusion of the armed stages of the Mexican Revolution, students from the Universidad 
Nacional created the Federación de Estudiantes del Distrito Federal. This organization served as a vehicle for the 
expression of student interests and demands for changes to academic standards, improved living conditions, and 
greater access to health and food services. César Sepúlveda, president of UNAM’s law school contends that the 
government granted university autonomy in response to student protest against the frequency of tests. Decades later, 
in 1956 students from the Instituto Politécnico Nacional (IPN) organized a student walk-out in an attempt to assert 
their right to better dormitories, increased buses, and greater student participation in university governance. Mabry, 
The Mexican University and the State, 208; Sepulveda, 385. 
21	  
the military invasion of 1968, which this chapter concludes with. Thus, by historicizing the 
student youth movement, we see that educational concerns constituted a radicalizing force during 
the 1960s and that these concerns reflect a desire among students to foster a political 
consciousness by means of an improved educational experience.  
I  Rector Ignacio Chávez: The 1966 UNAM Crisis 
 In 1961 after being elected rector of UNAM, Ignacio Chávez instituted an expansive 
reform program. Chávez recognized that conditions at UNAM were deteriorating as a result of 
rising enrollment, which had increased 820 percent since 1929.61 Such high enrollments 
diminished funds available for full time teacher salaries, consequently increasing teacher-student 
ratios and limiting funds available for academic research. Responding to this, Chávez 
discontinued automatic admittance to university schools and programs, instituting exams and 
grade standards as a determinant for acceptance.62 Additionally, Chávez restructured the 
curriculum of México’s national preparatory school, Escuela Nacional Preparatoria (ENP), 
requiring students to be enrolled for three years rather than two, in an attempt to better prepare 
students for university level work.63  
 Chávez’s strong conviction for academic discipline and excellence generated substantial 
condemnation and outrage from students. Reflecting on the tensions at UNAM, Rafael Segovia 
criticized Chávez for instituting reforms without consideration of alternative perspectives, 
suggesting that his authoritarian posture towards UNAM governance led him into direct conflict 
with others.64 Segovia explains that newly reformed curriculum generated unrest among 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Dr. Ignacio Chavez, “Formal Resignation of the Rector” Excelsior, April 30, 1966; Mabry, The Mexican 
University and the State, 215. 
62 Chavez, 215; Mabry, The Mexican University and the State, 223. 
63 Mabry, 223.  
64 Rafael Segovia, “Mexican Politics and the University Crisis” in Political Power in Latin America: Seven 
Confrontations, ed. Richard R. Fagen and Wayne A. Cornelius Jr. (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1970), 313. 
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preparatory professors who opposed the necessary re-training, along with the concomitant 
reduction in access to university degrees.65 Criticism also came from preparatory students who 
largely objected to admission exams, demanding that preparatory school students should be 
guaranteed admission.66 Students from UNAM’s Law School also opposed Chávez’s reforms. 
Jose Luis Alonos led a group of his fellow law students to protest the election of the new director 
of the Law School, César Sepúlveda, who they viewed as an equally stringent academic. The 
protestors declared a strike and threatened to take control of the law school. However, twelve 
days later the protest faded after Alonos and four other students were expelled.67  
 The president of the Law Student Society, Rodolfo Flores Urquiza, joined with 
preparatory students in organizing a movement within ENP to demand the discontinuation of 
entrance exams and the extended three-year curriculum. Urquiza also insisted upon salary 
increases for teachers. In support of these demands, law students published a manifesto to 
circulate student concerns within the law school. The manifesto recognized the problem of 
irregularidades, students who failed to regularly attend class and earn a university degree.68 
However, the manifesto asserts that makeup exams intended to “regularize” students were unfair 
and ineffective because the tests were scheduled without consideration of student circumstances, 
thus asserting the need for greater participation of students in decision making processes. The 
manifesto also complained of the failure of professors to appear in class, suggesting an 
inadequacy in teacher-student ratios, a problem Chávez was attempting to address. Foremost, the 
manifesto embodied a denunciation of César Sepúlveda and his role as director of the law school. 
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Reminiscent of Rafael Segovia’s criticisms of Chávez, the students claimed Sepúlveda ruled the 
law school as a dictator, failing eighty percent of students and unjustly firing over fifteen 
professors. The students also contended that Sepúlveda fired professors and expelled students 
with differing political views or who posed a challenge to his authority.69 Ultimately these 
demands were compiled into a petition given to Chávez in early March 1966. Though the 
petition embodied demands emanating from the law school, as the days unfolded students from 
other programs and prep schools expressed their support and supplemented the petition with 
additional concerns.  
Chávez’s failure to take satisfactory action in accordance with the petition promoted the 
escalation of student protest. On March 14, 1966 the students from the Law School accompanied 
by economics students organized a university strike, and the following day occupied the law 
school building. Chávez, however, refused to capitulate and continued to deny students their 
demands. In response students proposed a national strike on April 20, 1966 that would include 
twenty-eight law schools from around the nation. An article published in Política explains that 
students from both the law and economics schools, along with various preparatory schools, and 
other universities and departments throughout México joined together to form a democratic 
council that would be more representative of a national student body. This council adopted the 
name, Consejo Estudiantil Universitario (CEU).70  
In Rafael Segovia’s account of the 1966 crisis he reasons that most students shared the 
desire for the “acceleration and simplification” of studies, requesting flexibility in course 
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assignments.71 Additionally, students expressed a need for democratic governance within the 
university, including a greater say for students in decision-making.72 On April 26th student 
activism at UNAM climaxed, ending in the resignation of rector Chávez. Frustrated by unsettled 
demands, students surrounded the rectory. After being refused entrance into the building one 
student, Francisco Villaloba, entered through a window and was attacked by a police officer. 
Students responding to the Villaloba’s beating, stormed the building and took Chávez and other 
administrators captive. Six hours later Chávez resigned from his position as rector.73  
Throughout the crisis that culminated in Chávez’s resignation, many observers voiced 
concern that student activism was ignited by outside forces. Sepúlveda refused to respond to 
student demands, contending that non-university interests were responsible for the movement.74 
In May of 1966 Política published an article claiming that government forces wanted Chávez, a 
political adversary, removed from office, and thus manipulated students to gain access to the 
rectory.75 These accusations, however, serve to undermine the educational concerns motivating 
student activism. To imply that students were simply instruments of government manipulation 
obscures student disaffection with university matters, such as entrance exams, extended 
curriculum, and student representation within the administration. Further, the attempt at 
organizing a national strike and the formation of CEU is illustrative of an expansive discontent 
among student populations outside of UNAM, suggesting that there was more to activism than 
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government dislike for Chávez. Rather than attempting to dismiss student activism as merely 
external agitation, the crisis that unfolded at UNAM and throughout México’s universities in 
1966 should be seen as an early stage in the student youth movement. By expanding the history 
of student activism to include 1966, we see that educational concerns were in fact a primary 
radicalizing force of the student youth movement in the years preceding 1968.  
II Autonomy and Inadequacies within University Education 
By examining more closely the forces radicalizing students, autonomy becomes deeply 
engrained within educational concerns. During the 1966 crisis at UNAM, students desired 
representation within decision-making processes so that they could be active participants in 
shaping the education system. This concern continued to be voiced throughout the 1960s. As 
illustrated in a publication presented by CNED members, academic freedom was a point of 
contention. Activists challenged the influence of economic development on university programs 
and demanded access to courses which served to foster a socially educated and politically 
enlightened student body. Thus, autonomy for many students represented the desire to freely 
develop a political consciousness through university education, consequently, challenging most 
historical narratives of the student youth movement, which focus discussions of autonomy on the 
condemnation of military intervention.  
Historically, autonomy has been central to discussions concerning the relationship 
between education and the state. The university constituted a central component of the 
institutionalization of the Mexican Revolution. Entrenched in plans for economic development, 
the university was to be responsive to the demands of the economy, producing professionals to 
meet the needs of state interests. Consequently, state interests dictated the direction of university 
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education.76 University students largely selected career paths based on the country’s economic 
development, rather than personal interest. In 1929, however, tensions between students and 
university officials erupted, forcing President Emilio Portes Gil to grant México’s National 
University autonomy in an effort to avoid greater conflict.77 This decision denied the government 
direct intervention within the university and granted the right to independently determine 
programs of study and teaching methodology. However, the newly gained autonomy had its 
limitations. The government maintained control of the appointment of the rector and also 
remained in control of finances.78 On account of the university reliance on federal funding, a 
dependent relationship endured, constricting the actual degree of institutional autonomy.79  
 Autonomy was again limited in 1944 with the passage of the Organic Law, largely 
reversing the gains won in 1929. The first article of the Organic Law officially declares UNAM 
to be a decentralized state agency, responsible for training professionals, researchers, and 
technicians needed by society.80 Autonomy, then, rested on the university’s commitment to the 
government’s development plans. In return for the university’s support, the government would 
not interfere in the regulation of enrollment, academic standards, or plans of study as long as the 
university was attentive to restrictions established by the Ministry of Education. Additionally the 
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Organic Law also reformed the administrative structure of UNAM, creating a governing board, 
Junta de Gobierno. The Junta was responsible for filling vacancies, a change that greatly 
diminished the influence of students and professors on the election process and representation 
within the university in general. Junta members consisted primarily of alumni, not teachers and 
students.81  
Students and professors who coveted academic freedom came to resent the government’s 
dictate for the primacy of economic development in university education. Students began to 
associate government intrusion into academics with a crisis in higher education. CNED argued 
that there existed a disconnect between higher education and the interest and needs of México’s 
youth, asserting, “…the crisis of higher education can be defined as the complete dissociation of 
what higher education is and what it produces, from the educational needs of youth, the type of 
education necessary for independent economic development, and the social and political progress 
of the Mexican people. ”82 Therefore, CNED first observes that students, because of the 
influence of outside forces, were inhibited from following their desired educational paths, which 
in turn generated an alarming crisis in education. This crisis was marked by school dropout rates, 
inadequate quality of teaching, and a backwardness of curriculum.83 CNED recorded that only 
one in three students succeeded in completing their studies, and in 1963 forty-four percent of 
students dropped out before earning a degree.84 Overtime, students recognized that the 
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disassociation generated by outside influences failed to foster academic success and ultimately to 
provide students with the education necessary for economic growth, as well as, the social and 
political advancement of Mexican society as a whole.  
 Vocational guidance was partly to blame according to CNED. Counselors guided 
students towards jobs needed by commercial, industrial, and agricultural production, rather than 
encouraging students to follow career paths conducive to their aptitudes and preferences. CNED 
members felt that guidance offered to students was more reflective of a concern for the needs of 
employers rather than the needs of the children and Mexican society.85 Vocational guidance 
accompanied by inadequate curriculum inhibited students from assuming their proper role in 
society, which according to CNED was to become a productive force.86 CNED reasoned, in 
order to allow students to become contributors to society, education required modernization 
towards greater scientific content. Students should be encouraged to advance and share scientific 
developments to help production within the Mexican economy.  
 However, the crisis in education necessitated more than the elevation of scientific study. 
CNED explained that at the time education, responding to the needs of companies, centered 
exclusively on technical training, asserting “[education] is intended only to train technicians.”87 
This training was absent of political or social thought. CNED challenged this exclusion, stating 
that the crisis in education can only be remedied with a qualitative development of scientific 
study that is closely tied to the problems and needs of Mexican people and society.88 Thus, 
CNED was not proposing simply a unilateral solution of the escalation of scientific instruction; 
rather, students had a responsibility to contribute to the future of Mexican society through both 
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scientific and humanistic study. CNED instructed, “A graduate and an intellectual are both 
responsible for their obligations to society and culture.”89 A function of education, then, is also to 
help students assume their role as producers and preservers of cultural knowledge.90   
 Reflected in CNED writings, these students understood the crisis in education to be 
related not only to poor guidance and inadequacies in course content, but also to the penetration 
of outside forces within the education system. The intrusion of business or imperialist pressures, 
both foreign and domestic, contributed most significantly to the crisis in education. CNED 
believed that business concerns influenced education in such a way as to inhibit the advancement 
of a well-rounded curriculum rooted in both scientific and humanistic instruction. Unscientific 
texts and course programs were instituted so as to avoid content that could incite critical thought 
and inspire students to question economic relations. These measures students asserted, “…close 
the path to social and scientific critique.”91 Further, CNED contended that the bourgeoisie aimed 
to inhibit in institutions of higher education, “objective analysis of our country’s problems and 
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suggestions for paths towards solving these problems.”92 Ultimately, according to these students, 
imperialist and government forces aspired to use education as a means of securing the position of 
business elite in society by limiting the content of education and political agency of students. 
Gustavo Gordillo, a delegate for the Student Strike Committee, astutely comments on the 
contradiction surrounding the role of education and students within society. Expressing his 
frustration he writes, “We are continually told, ‘You are the future of the country.’ But we are 
constantly denied any opportunity to act and participate in the political decisions that are being 
made today…We want to and ARE ABLE to participate today, not when we are seventy years 
old.”93 By implication then, university education not only intended to inhibit students from 
analyzing the problems of society but also prevented students from becoming a force for change. 
The removal of political institutions and content from higher education was condemned 
by students. CNED proclaimed, “We express our disagreement with this position and consider it 
to be a harmful, undemocratic, and completely unscientific distortion of the youth, and also the 
cause of much frustration.”94 These students understood the attempt to restrict the ideological 
depth of Mexico’s youth as being not only unscientific, but also apolitical, and inevitably giving 
rise to an undemocratic environment. Similar complaints were made throughout the 1960s as 
students protested the right to belong to a political body. In 1966 a newspaper article published 
by El Sol de México, laments the transformation of UNAM, stating that it was once an institution 
open to “all currents of thought” but was increasing becoming “implacably closed.”95 The article 
continued, stating that bourgeois interests were constricting the avenues for ideological 
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expression, ultimately solidifying a “bourgeois democracy” within UNAM.96 In accordance with 
this statement both Chávez and Sepúlveda sought to curtail political activity of students, arguing 
that the purpose of university attendance was to study, not to partake in political debate.97 
Students condemned the apolitical education promoted by university administrators, 
challenging the current system, which they understood to be serving the interests of economic 
development at the expense of individual growth and the public good.98 This was one important 
reason why CNED recognized the need for student representation within university governance, 
so students could ensure the freedom to study according to their own interests and goals. Further, 
student activists envisioned a society strengthened by university attendance. In this society 
education benefited public interests by creating a productive and politically conscious citizenry. 
In terms of productivity, increased scientific study would allow for a more diverse and advanced 
labor force, strengthening the Mexican economy and the Mexican workforce as well. The 
demand for political content was also intended to serve society by creating an educated body of 
politically active individuals. Students believed these individuals to be central to the preservation 
of democratic practice, and that the act of limiting such content would challenge the ideals of 
popular government. Ultimately then, students conceived of educational concerns in relation to 
the greater society. Thus, these concerns were not simply a self-serving motivation, but rather, 
should be understood as a political project intended to engender democratic practice within 
Mexico.  
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III A Violation of Autonomy: Military Intrusions during 1968 
In addition to government intrusions into academics, direct challenges to university 
autonomy presented by military intervention generated substantial criticism from students, 
motivating students to join the movement. In the months leading up to the 1968 massacre, the 
military repeatedly invaded various campuses. On July 29, 1968 the military had been ordered to 
remove students from the streets of the city center and to occupy and take control of Preparatory 
School 1 of UNAM. Claiming that students had refused to leave the building and had become 
aggressive, the military and granaderos discontinued negotiations and invaded the school. Firing 
an explosive bazooka at the antique Baroque doors of the school, the police entered, detained 
126 students, and occupied the building. By 2 a.m. the following day, police forces had occupied 
four preparatory schools and one vocational school.99 Margarita Nolasco explains that challenges 
to autonomy continued into September, recalling witnessing a violent police crackdown. She 
remembers, “At about three in the afternoon on September 3, six buses full of granaderos—three 
hundred of them—pulled up at Vocational 7 to occupy the school…The granaderos started 
throwing tear-gas grenades…”100 Margarita proceeds to explain how she and other students fled 
from the building through an exterior exit, where some students began to battle with the 
granaderos.  
The military’s disavowal of university autonomy did not simply generate a physically 
aggressive response. Rather, most students chose a more peaceful form of activism and were 
inspired to organize to demand that the government respect institutional autonomy. This effort is 
manifest in the writings of various activist organizations. For example, the Consejo Nacional de 
Huelga wrote on September 26, 1968 that the occupation of school buildings by the army 
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impacted not only the functioning of the university programs and facilities but also violated the 
“core organic structure of UNAM,” which they stated as being the university’s autonomy.101 The 
council also labeled the military’s actions as “illegal.” This is illustrative of a current among 
student activists and supporters who interpreted the events in terms of constitutionality. The 
Communist Party issued a manifesto in support of student demands, calling Mexicans to defend 
the constitutional rights of free speech, assembly, and demonstration.102 The National Strike 
Committee in a letter to Bertrand Russell also exhibits concern over constitutionality, asserting 
that the granaderos were an “unconstitutional” anti-riot squad and served the purpose of 
repression rather than keeping the peace.103 
Rector Javier Barros Sierra also supported the student’s critique of the military’s actions, 
arguing that the troop’s aggressive confrontation and the government’s occupation of the school 
transformed UNAM. The Rector went so far as to resign from his position, stating, “In these 
circumstances, I can no longer serve the university, but prove to be an obstacle for it. ”104 Both 
the Strike Council and the Rector openly protested the intrusion of government forces because 
the military action challenged the autonomous nature of UNAM. These students along with 
Barros Sierra recognized that the school could not function properly under military occupation, 
and that without autonomy students could not carry on with their studies as usual, nor could 
Barros Sierra govern.  
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 While students denounced military intrusions, they also organized in opposition, 
generating support not only from students but non-students as well.  In a second statement by the 
Strike Council, members affirmed that a “democratic response” has been generated in the wake 
of violence, instructing students not to be “intimidated” by the “illegal” military presence, but 
rather to take to the streets in protest.105 In addition to the Strike Council other organization also 
demanded political participation in response to the loss of autonomy. In early August after the 
occupation of Preparatory School 1, the Communist Party of Mexico issued a second statement 
against the government actions, stating that the “military occupation” of University City 
constituted the most “serious attack” on university autonomy in some time.106 In the same 
statement, the party called for the defense of institutional autonomy, declaring, “Join your voice 
to the growing clamor of indignation, and protest this government action…”107  
The Communist Party and the Strike Council’s appeal for political participation against 
government intrusion was met by students and intellectuals alike. Margarita Isabel, an actress 
from México’s National Institute of Fine Arts (INBA), proclaimed that the police intrusion into 
INBA was the direct cause of her activism. Margarita wrote, “I joined the student movement 
simply because one day the granaderos turned up at the INBA with police dogs and chains and 
hauled everybody off to jail. And the INBA hadn’t even come out and said whether it supported 
the Movement or not!”108 Though Margarita was not enrolled in classes, she still felt compelled 
to enlist in the movement and provide support for the students. She explains that she and fellow 
actors and actresses collaborated in forming an “actor’s brigade” to advance the students’ 
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cause.109 Similarly, writing on behalf of an expansive list of individuals, Juan Rulfo and Juan 
Bañuelos affirmed the support of numerous intellectuals and artists. They openly criticized the 
violations of university autonomy, expressing outrage against the use of weapons on “unarmed” 
school buildings and people.110 In a show of solidarity with students, teachers, and the Strike 
Council this group of intellectuals chose to reproduce the list of the demands issued by the 
council, calling for the government to answer these dictates.111   
Interestingly, in response to the condemnation emanating from students and their 
supporters, government officials challenged how students’ defined the parameters of institutional 
autonomy. Published on August 3, 1968 in El Heraldo de México, former president Emilio 
Portes Gill directed students to the wording of the 1929 law in which he granted UNAM 
autonomy. He reminded students that the law did not transform the university into a “privileged 
extraterritoriality.” Rather, he argued, the university still resided within national boundaries, and 
was consequently under the law of the national government.112 Further, Portes Gill instructed, 
“When criminal acts are committed within the premises of the university, the government has a 
duty to prevent such crimes.”113 Thus, the government maintained the right to intervene when 
“criminal acts” occur on campus and also had the right to intervene to prevent criminal acts from 
taking place. In agreement with Portes Gill, President Diaz Ordaz declared in a presidential 
address that the army and other “forces of public order” could not intervene in matters that were 
strictly university concerns. President Diaz Ordaz writes, “The army or other forces of the public 
order should not intervene to solve problems that are within the exclusive competence of the 
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University and other institutions of higher education.”114 Essentially both presidents challenged 
how students interpreted the application of autonomy as a means to maintain the legality of 
recent actions taken by the government.115 Portes Gill and Diaz Ordaz reaffirmed the right of the 
government to intervene in order to uphold the law; in doing so they both classified the actions 
of students as “criminal” and constituting a dangerous threat to the national order.  
The legality of government intervention aside, the principal critique of the students and 
their supporters was that the forceful violation of university autonomy was unjust and 
undemocratic. The image of armed police guards occupying campuses around University City 
challenged the democratic ideals supposedly embodied in the granting of institutional autonomy. 
As the sources above reveal students from UNAM and other universities and preparatory schools 
were driven to activism as a result of the attack on what they understood as university autonomy. 
In doing so these students assumed a politically active stance that challenged the expectations of 
Portes Gill and President Diaz Ordaz who considered academic study to be the primary 
responsibility of the students.116 This understanding helps to complicate the simple dichotomy of 
labeling youth activism as strictly cultural or political. While students’ demands were deeply 
rooted in the university experience, which may cause some to disregard the political quality of 
student activism, student protest, at the same time, also assumed a very political form, most 
obvious in the student critique of government actions.  
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Though military intervention and the presence of troops and tanks clearly generated 
substantial commentary and outrage from students, police brutality was not the sole motivating 
force for student activism. By expanding our focus beyond the central narrative of the Mexican 
student youth movement, this chapter illustrates that calls for autonomy had much deeper roots 
within the education system. Sources reveal that concerns for autonomy should be understood in 
terms of academic freedom. An education driven by the need to produce a labor force of 
technicians failed to serve Mexican society. Rather students desired the ability to expand the 
educational experience by incorporating scientific, cultural, and political courses of study. In this 
sense autonomy is also in reference to the freedom to develop political consciousness. Students 
recognized a greater role for themselves within society, as preservers of cultural heritage and 
democratic practice. Thus, the educational concerns radicalizing student activism in the 1960s, 
constitute a political project as students contend for the right to become political actors as a 













CHAPTER  2  Struggling to Ascend the Social Ladder: Diminishing Employment 
Opportunities for College Graduates	  	  
 
“Ours is an economy with all the anarchy, wastefulness, and crisis of capitalism, an [economy] with rapid 
development of productive forces without a rash growth of productivity, without a "technical revolution," 
or complete industrialization of the country.” –CNED117 
 
“For a democratic education in a democratic México.”  CNED118 
 
Cesar Sepúlveda wrote, “In a general sense it can be said that in México the university, 
and specifically UNAM, is bound directly to the society it serves.119 Students experienced this 
reality in recognizing the influence of the government and business elites on educational content 
and university governance. However, economic forces continued to shape the lives of students 
even after leaving the university. Young student activist, Gustavo Gordillo, captures this reality, 
observing, “…young peasants, workers, and students are facing a very dim future, since job 
opportunities are being created for the benefit of special interests rather than society as a 
whole.”120 Gordillo’s indignation is representative of the fact that graduates were increasingly 
unable to find professional employment. Students like Gordillo and members of CNED 
interpreted the deficiency in job opportunities as being related to the influence of business 
interests within the economy. These interests distorted the direction of the economy so that 
society’s needs surrounding employment were not being met. 
This chapter focuses on unmet employment needs as a radicalizing force for student 
unrest. To understand the situation confronting college graduates this chapter first examines 
enrollment statistics and incentives to increase the outflow of college graduates, illustrating that 
students were graduating in increasing numbers. Despite these expanding numbers, however, the 
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economy was unsuccessful in keeping pace with the number of graduates, resulting in a tight job 
market for professional degree holders. Secondly, this chapter explores how México’s economic 
development directly shaped employment options by generating little need for professional level 
training. Without acquiring work, students failed to attain social mobility generally understood to 
accompany professional employment and a university degree. This dissatisfaction was also at the 
root of student activism, illustrating that youth became radicalized not simply by educational 
concerns but also by concerns for their material futures. The final topic addressed in this chapter 
is student condemnation of the aristocratization of education and the increasing costs of 
attending college. Thus, within the movement, student activism was driven by a class project to 
secure professional training and employment, and ultimately a position in the middle class for 
themselves and all Mexicans.   
Students throughout the 1960s felt the impacts of a competitive job market. For example, 
Rafael Segovia attributes the unrest among law students during the 1966 UNAM crisis as being 
rooted in the competitiveness of the law profession. He writes, “Lawyers are especially sensitive 
to their uncertain future…In administration, in private business, in politics, in diplomacy, and so 
forth, he has to face an over abundance of others with law diplomas, as well as competition from 
economists and degree holders from various other faculties of the social sciences.”121 Important 
in Segovia’s comment is the recognition of the repercussions of increased enrollment on 
professional employment. Statistics gathered from David Lorey’s scholarly investigation of 
México’s educational system helps to explain the experience of law graduates and other students 
during the 1960s. These statistics illustrate that Mexican youth were graduating from universities 
in numbers that overwhelmed professional employment opportunities, meaning that the economy 
did not have a great enough need for professional level training to meet the demand of graduates. 
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In the 1930s, the number of degrees granted by Mexican universities per one million inhabitants 
grew by 75 percent, and in the next ten years degrees grew by 64.2 percent. Despite a small 
decrease during the 1950s, by the 1960s degrees granted per million inhabitants had increased by 
118.5 percent.122 
A number of factors contributed to the increases in enrollments and graduate degrees. 
Originally there was a perceived need for professionals in industry, leading the government to 
subsidize education to stimulate economic development. Government subsidies then allowed 
universities to have relatively low costs of attendance, which augmented the number of people 
aspiring to pursue professional level training. Further, students attending secondary schools were 
motivated by the proliferation of college-preparatory programs to enroll at the university and 
pursue professional studies. Students also played a central role in the expansion of enrollment 
through their demands for open and free education. As illustrated in the crisis leading up to the 
resignation of Ignacio Chávez students actively protested entrance exams and grade 
standardizations, measures that would restrict admissions. Consequently administrators and 
government officials seeking to placate student activism and prevent unrest were swayed to keep 
costs low and allow for open admissions. These factors combined generated an increase in the 
number of students and ultimately of degrees granted, resulting in a corresponding increase in 
the number of professional degree holders seeking to enter or maintain their position within the 
middle class. However, the economy challenged this quest because there was little need for 
highly skilled labor, and thus many graduates could not find professional work. This inability to 
gain professional employment generated unrest among students, fearing the loss of the social 
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status granted to professionals. Consequently students were driven to challenge the current 
system in an effort to secure their class identities.  
II Economic Development and the Need for Professional Employment 
The scarcity of professional jobs felt by students was a concomitant implication of the 
economic policy pursued by México’s leaders. Beginning in the 1940s after the presidency of 
Lázaro Cárdenas, rapid industrialization became the cornerstone of Mexico’s plan for economic 
development.123 Key components of the nation’s industrial design, mainly protection from 
competition, reliance on capital-intensive equipment, and government-sponsored employment 
reduced the number of professional jobs available for graduates. Students writing for CNED 
were cognizant of the implications of poor development policies on the economy and the job 
market, astutely voicing their disaffection.   
Beginning in the late 1930s, restrictions were implemented against U.S. imports in an 
attempt to eliminate competition and protect Mexican industry. Import licensing and high tariffs 
served to limit the amount of foreign goods entering México and accelerate the expansion of 
manufacturing. Tax incentives and exceptionally low interest rates offered to Mexican 
companies also minimized competition. These practices continued throughout the 1940s and 
1950s, allowing for Mexican companies to produce goods that had once been imported, 
stimulating the growth of manufacturing.124 However, in reducing both domestic and foreign 
competition, protective policies had implications for the technological development within 
México. CNED claimed that the Mexican economy was undergoing a structural crisis, which 
they attributed, in part, to the failure to fully industrialize owing to the fact that there was never a 
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“technical revolution.”125 The “revolution” failed to materialize because with the elimination of 
competition there existed little incentive to institute new, more efficient equipment.126 
Correspondingly, investments were not directed towards research and technological development 
since there was minimal need for modernization of manufacturing equipment or increased 
efficiency. Thus, the need for professional level education and training traditionally necessary for 
innovation was negligible and failed to generate professional level jobs to meet the demand of 
graduates. The structural economic crisis as identified by CNED, directly affected university 
graduates who struggled to find work.  
Compounding employment shortfalls, the majority of factories in México imported 
industrial equipment from the United States, Europe, and Japan.127 CNED was critical of this 
practice, arguing that Mexico imported, “…the necessary parts for ensuring and maintaining the 
functioning of current industry and the technical research needed to ensure [México’s] rapid 
development.”128 These students understood México’s dependence on foreign markets for the 
formation of a developed economy as contributing to the economic crisis.129 Further, the 
importation of machinery from abroad indicated that Mexican factories were being modeled after 
their U.S. and European counterparts. Historian Judith Hellman contends that this was highly 
problematic because Mexican factories came to rely on capital-intensive machinery, like those in 
the U.S. However, capital-intensive production is utilized as a means to save labor costs in 
economies where the cost of labor is high and capital is more readily available. Yet the reverse 
defines México’s economy, labor is relatively cheap and capital is less abundant. Therefore, 
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México should have been utilizing manpower rather than machinery acquired through the 
accumulation of debt.130  
CNED students recognized the failure of Mexican industry, observing, “[Mexico’s] 
production is detached from the real needs of the environment in which it is established, thus 
eliminating the maximum utilization of national technical research.” 131 Mexican industry 
developed in relation to foreign manufacturing design, rather than with consideration to the 
context and “needs” of its environment. By implication, these students opine, industry is not 
employing México’s technical and research capabilities. One obvious ramification of this is that 
employment does not expand along with industrialization. Consequently fewer Mexican laborers 
are employed, and also fewer professional positions are created.132 As suggested by the students, 
research and professional level technical ability needed to produce machinery and capital goods 
takes place in other countries, and thus the need for professional knowledge is diminished along 
with the jobs such production would generate.133 
Relating México’s dependency on foreign markets to deficiencies in the job market, 
CNED comments on the intrusion of imperialist forces within México. These students contend 
that México’s lack of economic independence is visibly illustrated in the loss of professional 
work, writing, “Tasks do not arise for professionals to participate in finding solutions to the 
major problems of the nation.”134 CNED continues, explaining that the inability to apply 
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Mexican intellectual, scientific, and technical training and knowledge to help utilize the nation’s 
resources, is illustrative of the hold imperialists and business interests have not only the 
education system, but the economy as well.135 Consequently, economic dependence is directly 
related to the ability to employ and apply professional knowledge. Thus, by determining job 
availability, economic development was central to the student’s concerns, particularly those 
concerned with class. As long as the economy failed to generate professional positions, the 
material future of students, and their middle class identities rooted in professional employment 
remained in question.    
III   From Professional to Technician: Stagnation and the Loss of Social Mobility 
To the dismay of graduating students México’s economic development forged an 
industry with a diminishing role for professionals. The root cause of student anxiety, however, 
was more complex than simply the scarcity of employment opportunities. Students were also 
angered at the loss of social mobility. Gonzales Casanova, one of the many leaders of the student 
youth movement, asserts that vertical mobility and the prospects of ascending to a higher class 
was believed to be a reality that led many Mexicans to trust that there was hope for individual 
improvement. University education and the degrees earned constituted one of the primary 
vehicles for upward mobility.136 In fact, it was the social responsibility of the university system 
to promote social ascension by providing students with the advanced training necessary to gain 
professional employment. In turn, professional employment ideally provided students with 
higher income and social networks to advance to the middle and upper class.137 President Lázaro 
Cárdenas helped solidify the relationship between the university and social mobility by 
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expanding the opportunity for higher education to increasing numbers from the working class. In 
1936 Cárdenas sponsored the establishment of the Instituto Politécnico Nacional (IPN), with the 
mission of providing lower class youth the chance to gain greater access to professional level 
training and employment. Along with IPN Cárdenas also sought to bolster the working class by 
promoting the creation of lower level technical programs. These were short-term programs, 
which reduced the cost of attendance allowing less financially secure students to enroll.138  
Cárdenas was furthering revolutionary goals by helping advance the lower classes 
through an increased access to education, ultimately securing the idea that social mobility was 
attainable through hard work and university education. Unfortunately Cárdenas’ efforts fell 
short. One article published by the North American Congress on Latin America observed that 
students were increasingly seeing “the possibility for mobility decrease.”139 With diminishing 
opportunities for professional employment students struggled to find a means for economic 
advancement and alternative routes for social mobility. This is reflected in a letter to President 
Diaz Ordaz from José de las Fuentes Rodriguez, who wrote, “Today we fight to cultivate a better 
future.”140 The Mexican economy could not match the increasing number of university graduates 
seeking professional employment. Without access to professional employment students were 
unable to secure high-paying jobs to advance economically. Consequently, students worried 
about their positions within the middle class and their corresponding material futures.   
 David Lorey asserts that the rate of university graduates surpassed the rate of creation of 
“social places” for students by two to one.141 He elaborates that between the years of 1950 and 
1960 degrees granted by universities grew at roughly 75.1 percent, while the number of social 
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places in the middle class grew at 61.5 percent and 41.2 percent in the semi-leisure class.142 The 
difference increased during the next decade. From 1960 to 1970 university issued degrees grew 
232.1 percent, much greater than the positions available in the middle class, which increased 
73.6 percent and 95.7 percent in the semi-leisure upper class.143 One can conclude from these 
percentages that because students were entering the job market in numbers exceeding available 
positions in the middle and upper class, during the 1960s students experienced a decrease in the 
possibility of gaining professional employment and accordingly, access to the material and social 
benefits of the middle class.144 
 As previously outlined, México managed to industrialize with outdated machinery 
produced abroad, meaning that economic development generated jobs for technicians rather than 
professionals. Herberto Castillo Martinez, a member of the Comite de Lucha, reminded the 
president in a letter that development was dependent on the technical labor of México’s workers. 
He wrote, development, “is due to the continued effort of thousands of technicians, thousands of 
laborers, and millions of workers from the countryside and city and all of them are Mexicans.”145 
The importance of technical labor as suggested by Castillo Martinez is illustrated in the rate of 
demand. Between 1950 and 1980 the demand for professional labor grew 417.8 percent, while 
the demand for technicians grew 1,055.3 percent.146 Technician jobs were largely filled by 
irregularidades. These irregularidad students fell behind in their studies, never managing to take 
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final exams or complete a professional thesis. For reasons not entirely understood, during the 
1960s the problem of irregularidades increased. Among the student population at UNAM, for 
example, irregularidades constituted approximately 39.18 percent.147 These irregularidades 
constituted a growing number of egresados—students with technical training but no professional 
degree—leaving the university. Between the 1960 and 1980 egresados grew at an annual average 
of 13.9 percent, whereas professional degrees granted between 1950-1980 grew at an annual 
growth rate of 5.6 percent.148 These statistics illustrate the growing need for egresados to meet 
the demand for technicians within the Mexican economy.149  
The characteristics of labor greatly impacted class identities. For example, technicians 
held the responsibility of applying learned techniques and usually graduate from a secondary or 
preparatory school, or consisted of students who left the university without a degree.150 
Conversely, professional class status was distinguished by holding a licentiate degree of higher 
and generally held positions responsible for more advanced knowledge that allows for the 
adaption of systems of production, introducing and producing new technologies, increasing 
efficiency and output, and managing work environments and industries.151 With the changing 
nature of the economy, however, students were denied access to economic advancement 
traditionally provided by professional level training, and consequently the reproduction of class 
status was hindered. The demand for material and social gains obtained through university 
education and professional employment was necessary not only to ascend to the middle class but 
also to reaffirm one’s position within that class. However, as a result of México’s development 
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policy, demand surpassed the number of available positions in the economy. The economy 
focused on producing positions for technicians, meaning that graduates either faced 
unemployment at the professional level or were forced to take technician positions that they were 
highly overqualified for. Additionally, professionals had to compete with an increasing body of 
egresados qualified for technician labor and who were also more affordable for employers.  
The problem facing university graduates is clearly more complex than simply a decrease 
in professional level jobs. Rather, student activism was mobilized by a class project to secure 
professional level status. As this chapter illustrates the economy is central for the understanding 
of student unrest.152 One the one hand, students condemned economic development for reducing 
employment options along with the material gains necessary for the formation of class identity. 
On the other hand, student activism was mobilized to challenge the fact that economic 
development tended to benefit business elite rather than the interests of all Mexicans. Thus, 
students were mobilized both politically to create a more democratic society, and also by class 
concerns.  
In an article, “Un retrato colectivo de la clase media,” author Gabriel Careaga illustrates 
the frustration and discontent felt by the middle class stemming from the failure to obtain the 
material gains provided by social mobility. Careaga explains that beginning with the presidencies 
of Elías Calles and Lázaro Cárdenas, projects to create new bureaucracies, banks, and 
professional employment promised the strengthening of the middle class. Careaga details that 
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Mexicans envisioned middle class individuals as living in large homes with a garden and regular 
help. The middle class drove new cars and had good careers. They vacationed in places like 
Europe and Puerto Vallarta and consumed the finest cuisine. However, the benefits promised by 
Calles and Cárdenas failed to engender these visions. Careaga asserts that the idealized image of 
the middle class was a false illusion, and that middle class individuals lived in a much different 
reality. They drove old cars, lived in multifamily units devoid of any intimacy. Middle class 
homes were often rented and lacking garden space.153 This discrepancy between the idealized 
material gains of the middle class and their ultimate reality generated deep frustration and 
anxiety. Careaga asserts that middle class individuals desired to be “rich, prominent, and 
brilliant” but that their true existence was defined by “poverty and frustration.”154  
Ultimately Careaga depicts the middle class as being deeply plagued by an insecurity 
stemming from the failure to attain an expected prestige gained from material wealth. He 
explains that this insecurity is particularly troubling among youth, who stress over their ability to 
secure a prestigious social status. The power of youth to advance the social structure, Careaga 
asserts, begins in the university with the ability to “obtain a title that will guarantee success.”155 
As the next section illustrates, student’s sought not only to secure his or her own material futures 
through professional employment, but first through access to professional training. Students were 
intent on increasing access to education, not only in an effort to fixate their own position with the 
middle class but also to foster greater democracy in Mexico by expanding the middle class 
through university training.  
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VI  Privatization and the “Bottleneck” in Mexico’s University System: A Clamor for Equal 
Access to Education 
 
 The Strike Committee from 1966 affirmed, “The bottleneck is becoming even narrower. 
Tens of thousands of students have to fall by the wayside because the obstacles placed by the 
educational polices of the regime make it even more difficult to advance oneself.”156 Thus, 
implicated within these demands for access to social ascension, students demanded the 
democratic right to equal access to education, challenging what they perceived as an aristocratic 
education system that favored wealthier students. This section, then, examines aristocraticization 
as a radicalizing force that motivated political activism among students. Documents from the 
Strike Council, CNED, and other commentators illustrate that students were angered that access 
and quality of education was determined by income, leaving the wealthy with an unfair 
advantage.  
 In a CNED publication from a meeting with student leaders from the National 
Association of Law Students and the Student Federation of the Socialist Farmers of México, 
CNED claimed that student discontent was mounting due to the inability to foster a democratic 
education system.157 Standing at odds with democratic reform, the “aristocratizacion”158 taking 
place within the university was reflected in the partitioning of students into private and public 
universities. This separation was in response to the economy’s demand for labor, as schools were 
adapted to meet the needs for different levels of expertise. For example, the structure of public 
universities evolved to produce egresados for technical labor, and as a result generally had less 
rigorous course work. In doing so, public universities developed a negative reputation as having 
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an inferior education. Consequently, private universities formed to provide more challenging 
programs to those students who desired advanced training. In this sense private universities 
produced graduates to fill the limited number of professional positions in the economy, while 
public universities produced large numbers of egresados for technician work.  
The proliferation of private universities initiated a deconcentration of the university 
system. Documenting a trend towards deconcentration, David Lorey states that in 1929 México 
had only five universities all of which were public. By 1958 México had 125 universities, 48 of 
which were private, and by 1987 of the 326 universities, 191 were private.159 Activists at the 
time understood the increase in private universities to be related to the need to secure the 
interests and preservation of the business elite. Rafael Segovia writing in 1966 contends that 
private universities were founded for the purpose of “attracting the sons of the bourgeoisie and 
training the personnel whom it needed to manage its affairs.”160 Students perceived an education 
from a private university to be, not only more rigorous academically, but also to be free from the 
taint of political content. Segovia suggests that this understanding was important for the business 
elite who believed politics “contaminated” employees.161 Thus private education appeared to 
serve an “aristocratic” population, offering an apolitical and academically challenging program 
for the upper class that would produce a limited number of professionally trained individuals. 
Equally discernable in Segovia’s claim is that students were troubled by the fact that private or 
public attendance generally fractured along lines of income, meaning that students who could 
afford the cost of private education were able to receive more advanced training, while the less 
fortunate students remained at public universities, placing them at a disadvantaged position 
within the job market. This embodied to students an aristocraticization of education in which 
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wealthy students were given privileges not only in education but in the job market as well. 
Ultimately, students contested these undemocratic implications of aristocraticization.    
Opposition against aristocraticization occurred throughout the 1960s. In an article titled 
“The Communist Party of México: Before the New Situation at the University,” the party asserts 
that the aristocraticization of education was a primary radicalizing force against Rector 
Chávez.162 This opinion is reiterated in various sources. An anonymous author criticizes Cháves 
for placing “obstacles” in the way of preparatory students seeking admittance to university 
programs and faculties.163 The article asserts, “…[Chávez] put into practice the predetermined 
plan of the government to crush all vestiges of democracy in the University and to make of it an 
elitist institution of the most blatant form.”164  Referencing entrance exams instituted by Chávez, 
this author argues that the exams were based on knowledge beyond that of preparatory school 
curriculum and therefore private school students had an advantage in passing the test and gaining 
admittance.165 The Strike Committee echoed these arguments against Chávez, denouncing 
admission exams as an unfair tool to limit access to university education.  
Following the resignation of Chávez, the 1966 Strike Committee continued to challenge 
the aristocraticization of education, condemning what the committee labeled “educational 
injustice.”166 Educational injustice was embodied in the disappointing number of school-age 
students receiving an education. The Committee recorded that in 1960, of 8.5 million school age 
children only 5.4 million enrolled in primary school, meaning that 37 percent of children 
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remained unschooled.167  The problem was exacerbated as students advance educationally. In 
1964 only 280,000 students out of 400,000 primary school students enrolled in secondary 
education. A year later, 87,000 students were registered in preparatory schools throughout 
México, meaning that only 20 percent of primary school graduates continued their education. 
The tapering numbers of enrolled students can be attributed at least partially to admission exams 
and other restrictions issued by universities including UNAM and IPN, which eliminate potential 
students.168 Compounding the problem the Strike Committee recognized that there was a deficit 
in the number public schools, providing few alternatives to private education. Private schools, 
however, had entrance limitations of their own, most restrictive being the cost of tuition. To 
attend private school, the committee argues, “…presupposes belonging to a social class with a 
high income.”169 
At the heart of student opposition to aristocraticization was the demand for equal access 
to education regardless of one’s socioeconomic standing. The Strike Committee proclaimed, 
“Intellectual capacity and motivation are invalidated by material poverty.”170 Financial 
constraints, according to these students, limited the possibility for intellectual growth cultivated 
through a university education. The committee continues explaining that the vast majority of 
youth from the middle and working classes have to be participating in “productive activities” in 
effort to help support their families.171 By implication students forced to work part-time are often 
precluded from professional programs, which require full-time study, resulting in a concentration 
of financially well-off students enrolling in professional training. Compounding this situation the 
government offered almost no loans to working class students, especially to attend private 
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universities.172 For some youth, the added costs of books, materials, laboratory fees, 
transportation, and room and board made college entirely unaffordable.173 The committee adds 
that the situation was much worse in the countryside, where considering enrolling in secondary 
school or higher education was a “utopian” idea.174 Thus, the committee concludes that with 
increasing aristocraticization of education, “Only the children of the rich can go on to higher 
education.”175 
Similar critiques were echoed by CNED in their 1968 writings on the need for democratic 
reform in México’s education system. These students understood that aristocraticization of 
education stood directly at odds with democratic reform and needed to be addressed.176 CNED 
instructed, “It is a false start to limit the number of students for the sake of improving the quality 
of teaching. An impulse to the qualitative development of education must bring with it a 
quantitative increase in students, institutions, and teachers. Do not ask so the solution on one side 
leads to elite universities, and the other to a degradation of academic standards.”177 Students from 
CNED insisted on repudiating private universities that catered only to the elite, instructing 
students to, “Categorically reject elite universities.”178 For democratic reform CNED elaborated, 
“Every day all major sectors of the Mexican youth should be within reach of obtaining an 
education, so as to incorporate the economically weak,” maintaining that education should be 
within reach of all sectors of México’s youth. In accordance with students writing in 1966, 
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CNED activism challenged the reality that personal wealth should determine the quality of 
education a student receives, demanding equal access to education for all. 179 
To allow equal opportunity in education, reform efforts needed to be redirected away 
from capitalist interests.  It would be wrong, CNED concluded, to create a reform program 
replicating models presented by developed countries, insisting, “Other reform plans attempt to 
create a system of higher education based on models from developed capitalist countries, using 
propositions, such as ‘any one who can pay’ to establish quotas.”180 These capitalist countries, 
which governed access to education on the basis of “anyone who can pay,” preserved trends 
towards aristocraticization of education. Equally problematic was the forging of alliances with 
private funding, which CNED understood to limit the individualistic course of study, directing 
students towards careers needed for the economy rather than personal interest.181 Reform, then, 
that does not move away from private interests has the consequence of limiting access to 
education. Students wrote, “restrictions that establish bottlenecks at every educational level 
block the path of thousands and thousands of young applicants.”182 
A columnist writing over a month after the massacre in Tlatelolco Square insisted on the 
importance of continuing to demand an end to the aristocratization of education. Because the 
continued existence of the movement appeared unlikely, the columnist instructed his readers to 
assume the responsibility of fighting for equality in education. Reiterating the words of the 
students, he asserted, “Access to education should be given to all social classes, and not just the 
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privileged.”183 He warned readers that if the cost of education continued to increase, national 
progress would be hindered.184 Thus, similar to the student movement, this writer recognizes the 
centrality of education for the development of Mexico, and for the student’s democratic project.  
In response to persistent demands, the administration of Luis Echeverría attempted some 
degree of reform.185 In an effort to increase access to schooling, the Ministry of Education 
created additional undergraduate colleges and preparatory schools independent of UNAM, 
including the Universidad Autonoma Metroplitana.186 UNAM also founded new preparatory 
colleges focusing on the sciences and humanities.187 The success of these new colleges in 
equalizing education is debatable, however, the institutionalization of education reform draws 
attention to the political importance of the student movement. The response of the Echeverría 
administration illustrates that student activism was perceived as a political challenge, that needed 
to be addressed.  
Student demands for democratic education was a reoccurring concern across the globe, 
forcing governments to acknowledge their grievances. For example, in 1963 student activists in 
Paris challenged the organization of the university system. Students believed that overcrowded 
schools were contributing to dropout rates, unemployment, and the overall quality of 
education.188 In response to student protest the government instituted a two-year degree program. 
However, in reaction to this proposal, student activism intensified, believing that such a program 
would decrease the number of working class individuals with access to university education. 
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Further, students in Paris argued that two-year programs would be based on technical training, 
and consequently further reduce the humanitarian content of courses, a critique similarly voiced 
by Mexican students.189 Thus, a commonality among students both in Paris and Mexico resided 
in a political critique of economic development and development’s influence on education. 
However, in addition to recognizing the existence of a global movement of youth activists, this 
chapter illustrates the importance of understanding that within this movement there was likely a 
diversity of student concerns deeply rooted in local matters. 
Without doubt, Mexican students in the 1960’s organized to challenge the “bottleneck” in 
the education system caused by high costs of tuition and entrance exams. As students progressed 
through school, enrollment numbers constricted, allowing students with greater access to more 
resources to advance while others fell behind. The very top few students who could afford the 
tuition of private school received professional training, providing these students with an 
advantage in the job market, and accordingly a greater chance for social mobility. Middle class 
students were not simply troubled by the deficit in professional jobs, but also by the thought of 
losing access to professional status due to increases in tuition beyond their own economic means. 
Further, students also condemned the reality that fewer individuals would be able to enter the 
middle class without access to university training. Students understood a growing middle class to 
be symbolic of the democratic society the movement was fighting for. They envisioned a 
productive role for all Mexicans within the economy, arguing that development was not only an 
upper class project, but rather through increased access to education more Mexicans could 
contribute to the development of a strong economy and a democratic society. The Strike 
Committee in 1966 affirmed that education would only be authentically popular, when “the 
taking of political power by the working class will emancipate all oppressed classes, among them 
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the great majority of students.”190 Thus, these challenges to the aristocraticization of education 
reflect the complexity of student radicalization and the intermingling of class concerns and 
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CHAPTER 3  Extending a Hand to the Mexican People: The Radicalizing Influence of 
Economic Inequality  
 
“The demands of the democratic student movement, from the most simplistic to the most complex, have 
an interrelation with the situation and demands of the working people.” -CNED191 
 
“The creation of a democratic tradition in Mexico is as important and just as urgent a problem as 
economic development and the struggle to achieve genuine equality.” –Octavio Paz192 
 
As the previous chapter illustrates students’ demand for equal access to education was 
rooted in a desire for the democratization of México. However, this concern extended beyond the 
realm of education to include a deep commitment to the standard of living of all Mexicans. In 
1958 students took to the streets in solidarity with striking railroad workers, protesting a bleak 
standard of living and the failure of the PRI to improve economic conditions.193 Railroad 
workers in 1957 organized in opposition against their own union, Sindicato de Trabajadores 
Ferrocarrileros de la República Mexicana (STFRM) which they believed had become a puppet 
organization of the PRI.194 Workers complained that falling wages were not sufficient to keep up 
with the increasing cost of living. However, in contract negotiations in 1957 STFRM refused to 
advocate wage increases, illustrating that the leaders of the union were driven by the economic 
and political concerns of the PRI rather than the well-being of the workers.195  Railroad 
employees protested in the streets and occupied buildings, demanding the democratization of 
their union. This action generated substantial support from various national unions including oil 
workers, electricians, telephone operators, as well as students. The determined support of 
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students is reflected in their persistent demand throughout 1968 for the release of political 
prisoners including Demetrio Vallejo, the leader of the railroad workers movement.196   
Students continued to express support for the working class throughout the 1960s. 
Writing for their symposium on the need for educational reform CNED proclaimed, “The 
demands of the democratic student movement, from the most simplistic to the most complex, 
have an interrelation with the situation and demands of the working people.” CNED articulated 
an understanding of the “interrelation” between student demands and the current “situation” of 
México’s working people.197 Victor Rico Galan, a political prisoner, conveyed a similar 
understanding. In a letter addressed simply to “students” he instructs them to listen to the people. 
He cautions against focusing too much attention on the release of political prisoners, observing, 
“We political prisoners do not suffer more legal abuses nor more deprivations than Mexican 
peasants suffer under the sway of the agrarian authorities.”198 Victor Rico Galan continues, “We 
political prisoners do not suffer more legal abuses nor more deprivation than Mexican workers 
suffer.”199 The responsibility of the students according to this activist, was to stand up for the 
working people especially since students were fortunate to have greater flexibility and freedom 
to be politically active.200   
This chapter reflects the embodiment of Rico Galan’s words in the larger student 
movement, examining demands for improved standard of living for all Mexican citizens as a 
primary radicalizing force for student activism during the 1960s. Students deplored the poor 
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standard of living experienced by the majority of Mexicans, attributing this reality to low wages, 
the failure of income distribution, poor taxation practices, and the intrusion of foreign 
monopolies in México’s economy. To gain an understanding of the conditions lived by the 
majority of México, this chapter draws largely from Pablo Gonzales Casanova’s book, 
Democracy in México. Casanova calls for income distribution and taxation reform to mediate 
conditions and improve México’s standard of living. CNED publications also illustrate student 
frustration with the detrimental affects of foreign intervention in the economy. Additionally, 
sources from left leaning political organizations illustrate discontent with the injustice of 
economic inequality. Together these sources support the centrality of demands for improved 
economic welfare of all Mexicans as a guiding force of student activism.   
I   Assessing the Standard of Living  
In his book, Democracy in México published in 1970, Pablo Gonzales Casanova 
examined years of census information leading him to the conclusion that México’s marginal 
population increased or remained relatively the same over the last fifty years.201 He measures 
marginality in terms of one’s standard of living, and thus the degree of access to food, clothing, 
education, and overall health. Differences in standard of living he contends are largely 
determined by a region’s characteristics, such as urban or rural, and the measure of 
industrialization. He asserts that regions where two-thirds of individuals live contain less than 
one quarter of México’s industry.202 Based on census information from 1960, Gonzales 
Casanova records that in México’s urban areas 76 percent of the population was literate, whereas 
48 percent was literate in rural regions. In terms of diet, according to the same 1960 census 
25,630,000 Mexicans had access to at least one or more of meat, fish, milk, and eggs, for those 
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who were over one year of age. A less fortunate 1,840,000 individuals had access to none.203 
Gonzales Casanova concludes that 87 percent of the urban population had access to these foods, 
while 13 percent did not. In rural regions, though, 51 percent did not have access to any of these 
foods.204 The regional differences demonstrated here, illustrate a political critique of Mexico’s 
economic development. Gonzales Casanova challenges the implications of the accumulation of 
industry in particular areas and its concomitant implication for access to resources, suggesting 
that Mexico’s standard of living could improve if policy allowed for a greater distribution of 
resources.  
Gonzales Casanova continued his statistical analysis of México’s standard of living by 
examining school enrollment. He documents an increasing trend in the percentage of unschooled 
children until the 1960 census when numbers actually decreased. In 1930, 48.7 percent of the 
school age population between the ages of six and fourteen were unschooled. This number 
increased to 54.7 percent in 1940. From then there was a notable decline. In 1950 the percentage 
had dropped 49.5 percent and in 1960 numbers fell to 36.6 percent.205 According to these 
statistics the quality of one’s standard of living was substantially lower in rural regions as 
opposed to urban environments. Gonzales Casanova attributes this discrepancy to poor economic 
policy. Rather than accrediting differences in diet, education, and clothing to cultural 
preferences, he condemns the government’s distribution of national resources for the existence of 
inequality.  
To further elucidate the economic suffering stemming from political policy, Gonzales 
Casanova includes some brief comments on the troubling plight of México’s farmers. 
Referencing statistics put forward by an economic investigation, he explains that as of 1962 over 
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2.5 million farmers struggled with inadequate access to land. Over half of a million had plots that 
were less than a half-hectare, leaving the rest of the farmers with land that was not suitable for 
planting, or worse, no land at all.206 In a publication put forward by the National Union of 
Education Workers, educators also commented on the situation of farmers. They explained that 
land reform was a step towards improving social justice and had originally elevated the 
conditions for farmers. The publication asserted the need for land reform, which they argued, 
“…established new forms of ownership and land tenure, and which liquidated the exploitation 
and the servitude of the large masses of peasants…”207 The National Union of Education 
Workers was likely referring to the land reform promoted by President Cárdenas, the first 
presidency to seriously enact and prioritize land distribution in an effort to redistribute wealth 
and improved the social and economic status of many peasants.208  
However, following Cárdenas’ presidency, land distribution was reprioritized when 
Miguel Alemán took office, in effect worsening the condition of peasants and farmers. Judith 
Hellman explains that President Miguel Alemán revised agrarian law under Article 27, proposing 
a very different approach to land reform. He reduced the amount of land available to distribute 
by increasing the legal size of estates.209 Reflected in this revision and in other reforms since the 
1940s, government agricultural policy has tended to favor commercial production that benefited 
the large landed estates. For example, the bulk of government spending, including spending on 
agricultural research, has been directed towards large-scale production.210 Hellman asserts that 
small farmers or communal farmers have little access to credit or other technical advances, and 
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ultimately struggle to grow enough food to feed there families or to sell at urban markets. With 
insufficient land and government subsidies small farmers were placed in a dependent, and 
subordinate position challenging earlier revolutionary aims of agricultural reform as a means for 
democratization. This attention given to agricultural policy and the conditions affecting Mexico’s 
farmers, illustrate the extent of the movement’s political awareness. Students envisioned a 
democratic government that served the needs of the Mexican people by supporting self-
sufficiency among small farmers and localized markets. Thus, for democracy to flourish in 
Mexico, a shift in government policy away from the prioritization of business interests and 
commercial production was understood as essential.  
Contained within their commitment to the preservation of democracy, students looked 
beyond their immediate environment to demand change for rural and urban populations alike.  
The standard of living among México’s farmers and peasant population was truly alarming for 
Gonzales Casanova. After further analysis he concludes in his summation that a juxtaposition of 
the highest and lowest standards of living expose an illiteracy rate more than twice as high for 
the poor, a student-teacher ratio that is four times higher for the poor, and a death rate that was 
more than twice as high.211 Clearly, the research put forward in Gonzales Canova’s book 
illustrates that there was a substantial difference in the standard of living between the rich and 
the poor, a difference that was exacerbated for rural populations. While statistical information 
can be fraught with problems and generate more questions than it attempts to answer, what is 
important here is the concern exhibited by Gonzales Casanova. A devoted participant of the 
student youth movement, Gonzales Casanova’s research suggests that within the movement 
supporters were cognizant of the economy’s influence on the quality of life of all sectors of 
México’s society. Students organized to challenge the inequality epitomized in the differences in 
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the standard of living within Mexico, emphasizing the need for a more equitable distribution of 
resources to encourage the democratization of society.  
II Real Wages and Unequal Distribution of Wealth  
Gonzales Casanova, among others, understood low wages and meager incomes as one of 
the root causes of México’s poor standard of living. Since 1939 real wages had been in decline in 
México.212 Judith Hellman explains that despite the slow rise in wages beginning in 1940, 
increased wages were insufficient to match the rapidly increasing cost of living.213 Thus, while 
workers were receiving greater wages, in reality, their paychecks were not enough to cover the 
rising cost of food and housing, illustrating that real wages were in fact in decline. Consequently, 
by 1950 the earnings of workers had declined by nearly forty percent, as they were unable to 
experience an actual increase in income and ultimately a greater standard of living. Real wages 
continued to fall until 1952, only being restored to their pre-1939 level in 1957.  
One explanation for the continual depression of wages is a surplus in labor. Chapter 2 
illustrates how student dissatisfaction stemmed in part from the fact that there was an absence of 
professional level jobs to meet the demands of an increasingly large body of graduates. The 
working class population experienced a similar deficit in new jobs. One statistic stated that each 
year roughly 750,000 to 800,000 new workers were seeking employment; while on average only 
300,000 new jobs were created annually.214 Traditionally, when there is a large supply of surplus 
labor, the unemployed are forced to settle for lower salaries, in effect depressing wages. Poor 
salaries in turn fail to give working class Mexicans the income necessary to increase their 
standard of living. Referenced in his book, Gonzales Casanova cites a study conducted by 
experts from the Bank of México in 1963, which stated “twenty-nine percent of all families had 
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incomes lower than 400 pesos per month.” In rural areas Gonzales Casanova notes that the 
situation was much more severe; forty-one percent of families had incomes below 400 pesos per 
month.215 Gonzales Casanova then juxtaposed these monthly incomes in relation to México’s 
wealthier population. He concluded that the income variance allowed for drastic differences in 
standard of living, claiming that quality cannot be measured between relatively high standards of 
living and extremely high standards of living but rather should be measured on a scale between 
“poverty to wealth, and misery to splendid living.”216 A professor from the philosophy 
department similarly denounces inequity in Mexico, claiming that the nation was defined by, 
“social inequalities with scandalous extremes of wealth and poverty.”217 The student movement, 
accordingly, organized in response to the inequalities generated by the failure of income 
distribution. Without distribution, social stratification in Mexico became more polarized, slowly 
eroding the size of the middle class. This was highly problematic to the students’ political 
project, which recognized a large middle class as central for the strengthening of democracy.  
Overwhelmingly supporters of the movement convey a similar critique of income 
variance in México, denouncing an unjust distribution of wealth as the cause of the poor standard 
of living that predominated in México. One student took note of the unjust distribution of wealth 
when she stated that between the years of 1940-1956, “Workers were experiencing their relative 
share of the national income drop steadily.”218 A document published by NACLA supports the 
assertion that México’s workers were losing out on national economic gains, proclaiming that 
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while the poor were receiving less and less, wealthier Mexicans were receiving more. The 
document claimed, “In the twenty years between 1950 and 1970 the poorest 40 percent of the 
Mexican population saw their share of the national wealth drop from 14 to 11 percent, while the 
richest 10 percent upped their share to over half.”219 Joining in this condemnation, the Socialist 
Party, in a manifesto published in 1968, called for an improved policy which would distribute 
national income and replace current policy which it saw as being based on the “unjust 
distribution of wealth.”220  
CNED offered the same critical evaluation of income distribution in México, contending 
that the low standard of living was the “direct result” of an unfair distribution of wealth. CNED 
provided statistical analysis from the Secretary of Industry and Commerce to support their claim, 
asserting that in 1964 a small minority of economically active individuals, 33,000 people held 
54.9 percent of the national income. Further, 84.6 percent of economically active individuals 
earned a monthly income between 0-1,500 pesos, which translated to 23.4 percent of the national 
income.221  CNED and other students provided detailed statistical analysis in effort to elucidate 
what they recognized as an unfair distribution of income. The inability of the national economy 
to fairly disperse the nation’s wealth resorted in a deplorable economic inequality in which a 
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small fraction of the elite managed to accrue practically unlimited profits.222 This accumulation 
of wealth came largely at the expense of the working class, who failed to generate sufficient 
income to afford the increasing costs of food and housing. The existence of such inequality 
epitomized the inadequacies of current government. Conservative forces in the government 
adhered to the idea that that the nation’s capital gains would percolate down through all sectors 
of Mexican society, trusting a “trickle down” theory of economics.223 However, students 
recognized that this was a falsity, considering that economic gains generally reach the working 
class through high wages.  
Thus as the students explicate, in the absence of high wages current economic policy did 
not work, and consequently the distribution of wealth was inhibit and México suffered sever 
income inequality. Fair wages and income distribution, democratic promises embodied in the 
Mexican Revolution, failed to materialize engendering a low standard of living. This failure 
radicalized students to demand improved economic conditions. Students understood that a 
change to economic policy was necessary in order to foster a democratic society that benefited 
the Mexican people rather than continually rewarding the elite.  
III Foreign Interference, Government Spending, and Tax Reform   
Stated within their publication on the need for educational reform, CNED associates the 
influence of foreign business interests with economic inequality in México, communicating, 
“The unjust distribution of wealth reflects the characteristics of our dependent economic 
development and the distortion caused by the interference of international monopolies. This is 
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the effect of an unpopular policy, oriented towards shifting the main burden of development onto 
the backs of the workers.”224 CNED understands México’s economy as being in a state of crisis 
because of its dependence on foreign business. This dependence impacts México’s workers in 
terms of the burden of labor and unjust distribution of wealth. In agreement with CNED, 
documents from the late 1960s are abounding with accusations against the influence of foreign 
companies. CNED, Gonzales Casanova, and various other voices attribute the prioritization of 
business interests, both domestic and foreign, as the leading cause of low wages and 
consequently a low standard of living in México.  
The supremacy of business interests is a product of México’s adherence to capitalism as a 
means for economic development. Given the uneven and unequal development in the global 
capitalist economic system, México became dependent on foreign corporations. A NACLA 
report notes that the expanse of México’s economic growth occurred “within a strict framework 
of U.S. imperialism.”225 The report elaborates that in order to stimulate the economy, the state 
borrowed heavily from foreign banks, which resulted in multinational companies gaining 
substantial influence within the Mexican economy.226 CNED recognizes the correlation between 
development, foreign investment, and the accumulation of debt, explaining that the Mexican 
government relied on foreign credit for new capital as a means to stimulate growth.227 However, 
foreign credit generated lasting ramifications, most significantly México’s increasing debt.228 
CNED discloses that in 1967 México’s deficit was nearly 515 million dollars,229 and considering 
that foreign investment had been increasing in recent years, CNED reasoned that México’s debt 
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would only continue to swell.230 Mobilization against foreign influence, particularly the 
amassing of debt, illustrates the movement’s political critique. Student’s condemned the nation’s 
reliance on foreign capital, believing that development should stem from Mexico’s own 
resources and labor. Further, the use of foreign loans benefited only a minority of business elite. 
Thus, students challenged the current economic development for increasing inequality and 
consequently failing to strengthen Mexican society.  
Problematic to both CNED and NACLA reporters was the influential position business 
interests gained from México’s reliance on foreign credit. CNED students contended that 
international monopolies gained control over important sectors of the economy, in effect 
distorting social priorities away from the needs of the people to benefit business.231 In agreement, 
Gonzalez Casanova labels the Mexican state a “direct agent of big business.”232 When 
government is converted to serve the interests of the business elite, contention emerges over the 
distribution of government revenues. As previously mentioned the government assumed foreign 
loans to stimulate economic growth largely by building industry. In order to maximize growth, 
investments in industrial infrastructure are required. Since the 1940s the Mexican Government 
largely directed funds towards roads, dams, irrigation, hydraulic works, electrification, and 
communication systems.233 The government’s building of infrastructure necessary for 
industrialization created conditions ideal for private companies to easily construct facilities and 
factories. However, the spending of public revenues on infrastructure for the benefit of private 
businesses, by implication, illustrated the government’s deprioritization of social spending.  
Students and other activists questioned the government’s priorities and the allocation of 
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public funds. In the face of substantial foreign loans assumed by the Mexican government, a 
NACLA report comments on the absence of social spending, stating, “Despite the massive influx 
of foreign loans by the end of the 1960s the Mexican government spent a yearly average of 1.4 
percent of GNP on education.”234 The report further criticizes the fact that only 19 percent of 
México’s workers were receiving social security benefits.235 Statistics recorded by Hellman 
substantiate NACLA’s claim. She reveals that during peak investments in infrastructure during 
the 1940s and 1950s, less than 15 percent of total government investments were contributed to 
social welfare.236 Continuing this trend, in 1975 the state spent only 8.4 percent on education, 
and social security covered only one-quarter to one-third of workers. By 1980 state investments 
in health and welfare had dropped to 13 percent.237 Hellman and NACLA reporters capture the 
reality that with government spending on industrial infrastructure so high, there was little money 
remaining for social programs. Rather than spending for the people, funds were directed towards 
industrialization and the interests of business elite. Ultimately, the priorities of the government 
failed to reflect a commitment to democracy. Students believed that the government had a 
responsibility to alleviate conditions of inequality exacerbated by failures in income distribution. 
Aided by government spending, a greater number of individuals would have access to the tools 
necessary to become a productive force in Mexico’s economic development. Thus, by assisting 
only a small minority of elite, the government and, consequently, development failed to serve all 
of Mexican society.  
Students not only ridiculed foreign influences for dominating state priorities but also 
denounced the practice of deinvestment. Deinvestment—a term for the removal of profits made 
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in México by foreign companies—compounded the problem of an absence of funds for social 
spending. Students criticized the government for spending on industrialization to attract foreign 
investments, when these international companies then extracted profits from México and 
returned them to the company’s country of origin. In effort to mediate against this, CNED argues 
against the involvement of foreign companies, attacking deinvestment practices. CNED states 
that between 1940 and 1960 the average annual sum of deinvested capital was $66 million 
dollars.238 This reduces the accumulation of capital in México and consequently diminishes 
funds available for healthcare, education, and other social services. 
Gonzales Casanova also helps to expound deinvestment numbers. He records that 
between 1947 and 1952 foreign companies invested $6.4 million dollars and yet removed $111.7 
million from México.239 Between 1953-1958, $99.8 million was invested, and $116.6 million 
was deinvested. He recorded similar numbers for the following years. Between 1959 and 1964 
$114.1 million was invested and $164.4 million was deinvested.240 Gonzales Casanova points 
out that the removal of profits is detrimental to the Mexican economy not only because it results 
in the decapitalization of industry but also because it further exacerbates inequality within the 
markets. The cost of exportable goods from both the U.S. and México was a disadvantage to 
Mexicans, considering that U.S. goods imported in México were becoming more expensive 
while Mexican exports were becoming cheaper.241 Additionally, a central component of trickle 
down economics entails the reinvestment of profits back into the local economy in order to 
redistribute wealth, particularly in the form of increased wages. Thus, the removal of capital 
inhibited the distribution of profits and depressed wages. This left Mexicans unable to afford the 
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increasing cost of goods and with diminished benefits gained from social spending.  
Similarly, in a letter to President Diaz Ordaz, Herberto Castillo Martinez from the strike 
committee critiques the implications of foreign interference on the Mexican people. He questions 
why economic interests are centered on foreign concerns at the expense of México, asking if the 
president considers that foreign influences, “tend first to their economic interests, to the interests 
of their countries of origin, before the interests of our people...”242 Herberto Castillo Martinez 
continues explaining that the labor of the Mexican people was the source of oil, road, and 
railway production and, thus, the people have a right to the riches they generate without foreign 
interference.243 Clearly, then, unrest among students centered on the primacy of business 
interests above the welfare of the Mexican people. Activists such as Herberto Castillo Martinez 
from the strike committee and Gonzales Casanova, as well as, other student organizations 
demanded equal access to economic gains not only for social spending but also as just 
compensation for labor.  
To allow greater social spending, students maintained that the government not only 
needed to be less dependent on foreign interference but also to initiate tax reform. CNED 
maintained that in order for the state to have sufficient funds, tax reform was essential.244 At the 
current time México had a regressive system of income taxation, meaning that rates of taxation 
were lower as the amount being taxed increased, resulting in the income of the wealthy being 
taxed less than the poor’s income. The Socialist Party in 1968 condemns the unfair burden of 
Mexico’s tax system, stating that if profits must go to the business “tycoons” then as a class they 
should be responsible for the burden of social spending rather than the workers. The party also 
argued that tax reform was necessary to allow for greater income for the working class, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242 Castillo Martinez, 4/197.  
243 Ibid, 4/197.  
244 Central Nacional de Estudiantes Democráticos, Por la reforma y democraticización, 12. 
74	  
suggesting that the government needed to “…seriously and steadily increase the incomes of the 
working population and free them from many tax burdens.”245 Socialist Party members, in 
conjunction with student activists, were defending the interest of the people by demanding a 
progressive form of taxation. Injustice rested in the reality that business interests consumed 
government revenues to the detriment of social spending, and also in the fact that those most in 
need of government programs were responsible for contributing funds through a tax system that 
favored the wealthy. 
 Gonzales Casanova also finds fault in México’s tax system, berating its regressive 
nature. He alleges, “The system is unjust and favors income derived from capital property rather 
than derived from work.”246 Not only then does a regressive tax system fail to foster much 
revenue, but the system also unfairly targets the income of workers rather than those individuals 
with substantial “capital property.” By implication a system which taxes wage labor places the 
burden of generating government revenue for social spending on the backs of the working class. 
To remedy this situation Gonzales Casanova proposed a progressive tax system in effort to aid 
the sectors of society less capable of paying. By shifting the tax burden, and using income to 
determine the amount taxed, this proposed system would leave more capital in the hands of the 
lower classes, and work towards reducing income inequality. This reduction would allow for the 
emergence of the society envisioned by Gonzales Casanova in which there was an expanding 
middle class that increasingly contributed to economic development. The capital gains from the 
contribution of Mexico’s workers, then, must be redistributed to allow for the middle class to 
grow. Thus, Gonzales Casanova, along with other students, conceives of an intricate connection 
between advances in development and the strengthening of democracy. He hoped for an 
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economically advanced Mexico that was balanced with income distribution and equality.  
CNED students agreed with Gonzales Casanova, elaborating that a progressive income 
tax would generate greater revenue.247 Additionally, students called for greater taxation on the 
profits gained by large domestic and foreign companies and millionaires.248 This demand 
developed in response to the low rate of taxation on industrialists’ income, a practice employed 
by México as a means to attract private investment.249 Reform measures laid out by CNED also 
urged that property owners and “capitalists” who earned a yearly income over half a million 
pesos should be required to pay supplemental surcharges. Ultimately, these measures endeavored 
to generate increased government revenues for social spending in an attempt to reduce economic 
inequality.250  
Inequality generated from failures in income distribution, Mexico’s system of taxation, 
and diminished social spending, motivated students to demand an economic policy that benefited 
the working class and encouraged the redistribution of profits toward wages and social spending, 
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rather than an economic system centered on the interests of both domestic and foreign business 
elites. As demonstrated in the demand for equal access to education, students envisioned a 
growing and productive middle class as the foundation of a democratic society. In effort to 
achieve this political aim, students promoted economic development but also demanded that 
productivity be partnered with the redistribution of capital to improve conditions for the lower 
classes and ultimately expand the size of the middle class. This concern for the economic 
improvement of the poorer sectors of the Mexican population reiterates the political content of 
student activism. Students were motivated to challenge economic policy and inequality because 


















CHAPTER 4 A Population without Representation: Challenging México’s Single-Party 
System 
 
“The great historical movements in our country have been formed through the participation of all the 
people and not by lawless pressure groups or factions.”251 
 
“The system of balance of powers does not work. There is a strong disequilibrium, and it favors the 
executive. Thus one cannot help but wonder what the function of the legislative power is. It seems that the 
legislative power has a symbolic function.” –Gonzales Casanova252 
 
The growing concern for the Mexican people among students represents participation in a 
larger international political project. During the post-World War II period there was an 
increasing commitment to improving the conditions of the lower classes. Within this movement 
there was a particular emphasis on promoting working class participation within the political 
sphere as a means for advancing change.253 Mexican students exhibited a similar attention to 
increasing political participation. Students understood that in order for the government to be 
attentive to the needs of the people, México’s masses necessitated their own political 
representation. Without such representation and democratic organizations to promote the 
interests of the people, business would continue to dominate policy.   
This chapter examines political reform and demands for popular representation as a 
radicalizing force of the student movement. Sources illustrate discontent over the absence of a 
political party to represent the needs of the Mexican people. Students cite failures of 
unionization, minimal oppositional parties, and a concentration of power, as key factors 
inhibiting the formation of a popular organization and a government that is responsive to the 
needs of the people rather than big business. Thus, in order for the materialization of the society 
students envisioned, greater representation for the Mexican people was essential.  
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I   Participatory Democracy within the Student Movement 
In an expression of the democratic ideals students desired for Mexico, the structure of the 
student movement itself reflected a deep concern for equality and representation. The National 
Strike Committee (CNH) consisted of 250 representatives from all participating schools, roughly 
128 private and public universities and secondary schools. These representatives constituted the 
formal structure of CNH and were responsible for larger organizational strategies, while 
numerous localized representative bodies made up of thousands of student participants managed 
daily activities.254 As a general rule the movement had no specific leaders. Rather, on a weekly 
basis CNH reassembled the movement’s governing committee.255 Judith Hellman suggests that 
this was important in order to limit the influence of government control. She explains that in the 
absence of definitive leaders the government could not easily attack, co-opt, or imprison key 
individuals in order to derail the movement.256 Additionally, rotating positions of responsibility 
encouraged a distribution of power, preventing any one individual from gaining too much 
influence while also reinforcing the democratic nature of the movement.257 The creation of 
smaller representative bodies to focus on the local level also reflects the importance of grassroots 
democracy to student activists.  
Autonomous student brigades organized daily activities and outreach on a more localized 
level. Thousands of student participants formed brigades for the purpose of popularizing their 
demands and building a stronger movement. These students passed out leaflets, hung up posters, 
collected donations, organized public forums, and recruited supporters from México’s working 
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class.258 A report reproduced by the Strike Committee of the Philosophy department, asserted 
that the brigades successfully organized both high school and university students, stating, 
“…students have become political forces capable of going into action in any moment.”259 The 
report further states that the continual effort of the brigades was necessary for generating support 
from the people, contending that the success of the movement rested on the participation of the 
working masses.260 In this sense student brigades epitomized the democratic nature of the youth 
movement. The movement encouraged direct democracy by promoting the active participation of 
all student activists and working class individuals alike. Students also initiated a strong program 
of outreach to the Mexican people in effort to allow for participatory democracy among all 
sectors of society. Ultimately, students attempted to replicate their imagined society within the 
structure of CNH itself, emphasizing the importance of democratic organization, representation, 
and a deconcentration of power. Student activism was driven by the desire to inspire these values 
that defined CNH within Mexico to create a strong, democratic government.  
II  Unorganized Workers and the Inadequacies of Unionization  
Gonzales Casanova suggests that the absence of large and inclusive unions precluded the 
existence of a democratic working class movement, and accounts for the lack of representative 
organization for the majority of the Mexican population.261 In agreement with Gonzales 
Casanova many students attributed the lack of political representation of the working classes in 
part to government control of labor unions. CTM, the Confederación de Trabajadores de México 
(The Confederation of Mexican Workers) constituted a primary example of government 
infiltration in labor unions. In March of 1938 CTM became intricately linked to the government 
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with President Cárdenas’ transformation of the National Revolutionary Party into the Party of the 
Mexican Revolution (PRM). Cárdenas reformulated the structure of PRM to consist of four 
distinct sectors, the army, the popular sector,262 a National Peasant Confederation, CNC, and also 
CTM.263 Cárdenas created these sectors in an attempt to limit divisions and also expand 
representation by institutionalizing participation within the party.264 As a result CTM became 
closely affiliated with PRM, subordinating the main workers’ organizations to the government 
interests. According to Gonzales Casanova, “two-thirds of unionized workers belonged to 
CTM.” Worse still, argues Gonzales Casanova, only 10.5 percent of México’s working 
population was unionized.265 Thus, the majority of those workers who did belong to a union were 
represented by an organization that was engrained within the realm of government influence. 
One example of this was the railroad workers strike in 1958 when union leaders yielded to the 
demands of the government at the expense of the needs of the workers. 
Government influence on unions was also reflected in the relationship between strikes 
and economic conditions. Gonzales Casanova argues, “In most countries where there are 
powerful trade unions and worker’s unions, we find a clear correlation between strike 
movements and economic cycle.”266 However, in México he finds no such correlation due to the 
control of unions by the government.267 Union leaders under the guise of government or business 
elite are encouraged to act in accordance with the needs of business rather than workers. Thus, 
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despite the constitutional right to organize and strike guaranteed by Article 123, barriers existed. 
These barriers included the government control of unions, intended to inhibit the ability of 
unions to exercise their most potent weapon – the right to strike, shut production down, and cut 
into the owners’ profits.268 Without these weapons, the political autonomy of workers was 
largely diminished. Traditionally unions provided workers with the opportunity to critique 
conditions and demand change. However, the influence of the government prevented this from 
actually transpiring. Therefore, students asserted the right of political autonomy for Mexican 
workers as a necessary component for the democratic society they envisioned.   
According to one student “underworld gangs” also served as a tool to inhibit the 
organizational capabilities of unions. This student explains, “These gangs used bayonets to 
maintain their power.”269 The role of these “gangsters” was to intimidate workers and peasants to 
vote for candidates endorsed by the official party, guaranteeing that positions of leadership 
would be held by individuals sympathetic to party concerns. This student maintains that these 
coercive tactics created a “rupture” between workers and the PRI as workers became alienated 
from the government as their needs went unmet. Additionally, coercive infiltration led to a 
“lowering of the masses’ standard of living.”270 In the absence of an organizational body to 
defend the rights of workers, business managers felt little pressure to provide wage increases or 
health benefits which, in turn, lowered the standard of living of México’s workers.  
 Other students also commented on the lack of representation for workers in industrial or 
workplace decisions. Government influence on unions, CNED explained, resulted in the 
diminishing capability of labor organizations to protect the needs of their workers. CNED 
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contended that government control “…has weakened the role of united front organizations to 
defend the interests of it’s members.”271 Once weakened, unions fail to be a viable force to keep 
business interests in check and ensure the interests of workers.272 In an essay published in 1966, 
an anonymous student commenting on the lack of educational autonomy implies that the 
“suffocating” government control of unions, popular organizations, and universities helped to 
secure a “bourgeoisie democracy.”273 Ultimately then, government control over labor unions 
rendered unions ineffective, allowing business interests to be prioritized above workers’ needs. 
By implication, without the ability to organize and demand representation, the rights of workers 
went unprotected, thereby exacerbating economic inequality. This inequality and the diminished 
access to political autonomy traditionally offered by unions, challenged the student’s ideal of a 
participatory democracy.  
III   Concentration of Political Power: The Influence of the Executive Branch and the 
Bourgeoisie  
 
In addition to the inadequacies of unionization, the absence of a political party for the 
people also excluded the needs of the working class from being represented in government 
decisions. Gonzales Casanova asserts, “There are no mass parties.”274 He continued, “Parties are 
not organized, subsidized, or controlled by citizens. The power groups organize and control 
parties.”275 The “power groups” to which Gonzales Casanova refers are undoubtedly the business 
interests which dominated the popular sector of the PRI. Rather than representing the “popular” 
classes as the title suggests, this sector represents the interests of the middle class but more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271 Central Nacional de Estudiantes Democráticos, Por la reforma y democraticización, 18.  
272 Ibid, 18.  
273 “The Fall of the Rector: A Student Perspective,” 321. 
274 Casanova, 123. 
275 Ibid, 123.  
83	  
predominantly the elite, including professionals, landowners, industrialists, and businessmen.276 
Similar to the institutionalization of labor within the official party, this sector also integrated 
business associations into the party. The popular faction became the most influential faction of 
the official party, largely because of the sector’s economic advantage. Benefiting from higher 
education and increased incomes, this class was more easily able to lobby the government for its 
own special interests. Additionally, the government could not ignore the interests of such an 
economically valuable industrialist and business class, considering that the capital that this class 
owned was integral for the country’s industrial development. 
Students and their supporters repeatedly challenged the political power of the 
bourgeoisie. The CNH commented on the strength of the popular sector, referring to them as the 
“ruling bourgeoisie.” Similarly, the Strike Committee of the Faculty of Philosophy asserts, “The 
post revolutionary Mexican state has always served the bourgeoisie…”277 The unequal state of 
education, the economy, and Mexicans’ standard of living illustrated to students that the lower 
classes had minimal leverage within policy considerations. The strength of the elite was also 
understood to be inhibiting the political participation of the majority of the Mexican people, a 
promise made by the Mexican Revolution. Híber Conteris, writing for a Spanish newspaper, 
stated, “The national bourgeoisie, having captured control of the government, has managed to 
dominate it with populist slogans and vertical organizations that are controlled directly from 
above. This populist ideology, characteristic of the Mexican Revolution, does not dispense with 
mass participation, but limits itself to using it for its own interests.”278 Reflected in the words of 
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Híber Conteris, students understood the influence of business interests within Mexico as a 
challenge to the political autonomy of the lower classes. As illustrated in the structure of their 
own organization, CNH, students believed that vertical organizations controlled from above 
limited popular participation. In order to ensure the formation of a strong commitment to 
democratic practice in Mexico, political power needed to be dispersed. Ultimately, this would 
increase representation and challenge the hold of business interests within the government, two 
primary aims of the students’ political project.  
In correlation with the strength of business interests, a concentration of power at the 
executive level also limited mass participation and representation in government. Bo Anderson 
and James Cockcroft suggest that although interest groups such as those in the popular sector 
constituted an important force in Mexican politics, the power this group held was only of 
secondary importance and that the primary power source was in fact the inner circle of the ruling 
party. In elaboration they explain that interest groups were responsible for voicing demands but 
ultimately the decision on how to act was promulgated by the party’s inner circle.279 Others, 
however, draw less of a distinction between elite influences and the party’s inner circle, arguing 
that participation in the inner circle is the pinnacle of bourgeois strength.280 The inner circle, also 
referred to as the revolutionary family or revolutionary coalition, consisted of a group of men 
who advised the president on all important policy decisions. The influence of the revolutionary 
family superseded that of any interest group, political organization, and even the official party.281 
Thus, in the presence of such a strong authority, this group of elite men muffled the voice of 
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other sectors, especially the working class.  
The executive branch in México, particularly the inner circle, exhibited a tremendous 
concentration of power. Gonzales Casanova provides a sense of how students perceived the 
distribution of power in México. He writes,   
Congress is controlled by the president; the states are controlled by the Federation; the 
municipalities are controlled by the states and the Federation. In sum, the model of the 
three powers, the system of counterweights and balances, or the local government of 
elector-citizens conceived by the philosophers and legislators of the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries does not obtain. What does obtain is a concentration of power—in 
ascending order—in the government, the central government, the executive branch, and 
the presidency. With the exception of the limitation imposed by the Supreme Court in 
particular cases…an analysis of the power structure in México would show the president 
as exercising unlimited power.282 
Delving into greater detail Gonzales Casanova articulates a conception of México’s political 
structure that stands in contradiction to traditional democratic models. The structure he depicts is 
largely dependent on the executive branch and thus fails to act as a protective system of checks 
and balances. According to Gonzales Casanova states are entirely dependent on the central 
government not only militarily but also politically and financially. The governor, for example, is 
largely controlled by the federal government, which can simply depose of a governor by various 
means if chosen. Zone commanders who are appointed agents of the federal government watch 
over state governors, subjecting local authorities to a degree of military control.283 The autonomy 
of governors is also constrained by feelings of indebtedness to the president for their 
appointments, consequently influencing governors to act in conformity with the presidential 
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agenda.284  
 Reliance on federal aid further places states and governors dependent on the central 
government. Gonzales Casanova explains that states received aid based on their “economic 
status,” meaning that more advanced and wealthy states receive greater aid.285 He also suggests 
that the political affiliation of a governor could serve to influence the amount of aid received. 
Either way, the less funding a state receives, the less effective state government can function, 
thus reducing the representative capabilities at the state level. Particularly problematic to 
Gonzales Casanova was the loss of the free municipalities and the “classical model of local 
government.”286 Surviving since Spanish imperialism, municipalities formed the primary social 
and political organization, gaining greater importance after the Mexican Revolution when the 
Constitution granted municipalities autonomy.287 Therefore, the intervention of federal forces, 
due to decreasing funds, resembled a violation of revolutionary ideals and inhibited democratic 
organization. Students adhered to the understanding that small local organizations were central 
for recognizing the needs of the people; this is illustrated in the local representative bodies of 
CNH that coordinated popular support. A loss of municipal autonomy then, also inhibited the 
representative reach of local government, further challenging the formation of a working class 
political organization. Ultimately, Gonzales Casanova understands the importance of local 
participation to the ideals promoted by the student movement. Without local representation, 
participatory democracy is hindered.  
 The loss of local authority to federal control was compounded by the ineffectiveness of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
284 Ibid, 27.  
285 Ibid, 26. 
286 Ibid, 30. The functioning of municipalities illustrates complications with funding. Resulting from reductions in 
aid, many municipalities would lose the ability to maintain basic government functions. As a result, federal forces 
would seize control of local government, leaving municipalities entirely dependent on the federal government.  
287 Hamnet, 238.  
87	  
larger government bodies. Gonzales Casanova asserts that since the presidency of Álvaro 
Obregón the legislature had been under complete control of the executive branch. After closely 
examining legislative activity between 1934 and 1960, he concludes that the majority of the 
legislative bills proposed by the president passed unanimously. He also notes that bills that did 
not have unanimous support never generated opposition greater than 5 percent.288 Therefore, 
Gonzales Casanova argues, the Chamber of Representatives clearly maintained little actual 
value. Rather, the Chamber merely served a “theoretical” purpose to create the appearance of 
legality.289 A similar ineffectiveness is noted in the court system, suggesting that judges 
generally favored acts coming from the executive. Even the Supreme Court tended to adhere to 
the policy of the executive.290 The unequal distribution of power between different branches of 
the government is just one of many issues that motivated young activists like Gonzales Casanova 
to become politically active and demand democratic reform of these key government branches.  
IV  Opposition Parties: A Challenge to México’s One-Party System  
The concentration of power at the executive level was exacerbated by the absence of 
oppositional forces and the dominance of a single party in México’s political system. A 
participant in the movement, Professor M. Mayagoitia, questions if there had ever been a solid 
democratic tradition in Mexico, considering that there was only one political party.291 The 
single-party system that existed in México during the 1950s and 1960s stands in contradiction to 
the ideals envisioned by students. Political parties, generally centered on a guiding ideology, 
organize to represent the interests of various populations of voters. In México, however, the 
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) held a monopoly of power for decades, diminishing 
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representative capabilities of the government. The party’s dominance was largely secured 
through the absence of a strong viable political party to challenge the PRI. UNAM graduate 
Rafael Segovia contends in his exposition on the university and politics in México that a political 
organization capable of mobilizing popular support did not exist in México.292 General 
consensus largely supports Segovia. Gonzales Casanova, for example, states, “To the present 
there has been no indication of the emergence of a classical party system.”293 In support of his 
claim Casanova references election results to illustrate that only in 1952 were oppositional forces 
able to poll more than 25 percent of the vote.294 Without institutional strength, he reasons, 
oppositional parties remain mere pressure groups.295 Thus, while oppositional groups existed 
these organizations failed to become a strong enough force to challenge the power of the PRI, 
mobilizing students to contest the diminished representation within México.  
Considering the importance of representation and the development of a multi-party 
system to the student’s political project, mobilization against the PRI’s involvement in the 
limiting of oppositional forces was paramount. Observers in the 1960s attributed the curtailment 
of oppositional groups to forms of cooption and repression.296 Cooption entails attempts by the 
PRI to appropriate ideas proposed by oppositional groups into the PRI’s leadership and decision-
making processes. In doing so the support that could be gained from the promotion of these new 
elements is gained by the PRI at the expense of other political parties, thereby undermining the 
influence of possible threats posed by oppositional organizations. These dissident groups submit 
to integration in the hopes that their interests will be institutionalized by the PRI, however, 
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commentators question how often the PRI actually follows through.297 Additionally the PRI has 
been known to express a measure of recognition to political organizations as long as these groups 
do not constitute a serious threat. For example, the Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN) a 
conservative opposition party, was generally tolerated by the PRI. In fact, PAN managed to 
attract significant support during the late 1960s, winning electoral victories on the state and local 
level. However, these gains were inadequate to challenge the PRI.298 The official party’s 
toleration of PAN was largely an exception, rooted in PAN’s conservative politics. Other 
organizations that were openly hostile to the PRI did not receive the same support. For example, 
one political campaign of the opposition party, Frente Electoral del Pueblo (FEP), was banned by 
the PRI. When FEP announced their own presidential candidate in 1964 the party was prevented 
from registering as a legal political party.299   
In addition, the PRI used their control over legislation to inhibit oppositional 
organizations. For example, the PRI continued to employ Article 145 of the penal code—
originally implemented by President Manuel Avila Camacho to protect against internal 
subversion during war—as a tool against dissident voices. Utilized most extensively during the 
1960s this measure was used to target leftist activists in attempt to curb political protest. 
Experiencing the repressive nature of this law first hand, the dismissal of Article 145 constituted 
one of the key demands of the student youth movement. Margarita Suzan in her synopsis of 
student activities between July and October of 1968 refers to continual student struggles against 
Article 145 and its unconstitutionality.300 Writing on behalf of a coalition of intellectuals and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
297 Anderson, 304.  
298 Anderson, 303, 305; A change in the electoral system, put into effect for the first time in 1964, guarantees that 
some officially “approved” opposition groups get representation in the federal chamber of deputies. 
299 Anderson, 304-305. 
300 Gudalupe Acevedo and Margarita Suzan, “Relación de los hechos: July-Octubre 1968,” in Mexico: Conflicto 
estudiantil 1968; documentos y reacciones de prensa, comp. Tarsicio Ocampo (Cuernavaca: Centro Intercultural de 
Documentación, 1969), 4/51.  
90	  
artists, Juan Rulfo similarly contested the nature of the law, calling for the removal of Article 
145. He states that any activity or “intellectual manifestations” that challenges the official 
rhetoric was labeled as “subversive” and consequently subject to punishment.301 This policy, 
Juan Rulfo contends, inhibited political representation, preventing the emergence of a 
diversification of ideological, literary, and scientific sectors.302 Activists participating in the 
student youth movement clearly interpreted the repressive nature of the law as inhibiting public 
expression. Public expression and the sharing of ideas allow for collective organization, and 
together constitute important components of a participatory democracy. Authoritarian measures 
to restrict such activity challenged the idealized society of students.   
In the absence of influential labor unions and workers’ political parties México’s lower 
and middle classes had few constitutional mediums for political representation. Gonzales 
Casanova concludes that mediators and negotiators are the only means for marginal populations 
to voice their concerns, leaving the majority with few options for political participation.303 Most 
individuals ultimately resorted to public protest as one of the few viable means of challenging 
the dominance of business interests within the government.304 As part of their own political 
protest, CNED recognized that without representative organizations, the people were largely left 
out of the political process. CNED students observed, “From a political point of view, [Mexico] 
lacks a democratic system that allows for popular participation in the solving of our nation’s 
most serious problems.”305 The democratic government envisioned by CNED and the student 
movement in general, necessitated equal participation, designating that every citizen should have 
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an equal influence on political decisions and the direction of the country. However, without 
political autonomy or an organizational body to defend the interests of the people, business elite 
easily influenced government policy to the detriment of the working class. Thus, students 
denounced Mexico’s single-party system for diminishing the political autonomy of many 
Mexicans and ultimately inhibiting participatory democracy. Students understood democracy as 
being the most essential component for the developed society they envisioned, consequently 





















CONCLUSION:  The Continuities of a Capitalist System: Political Protest in México and 
the United States 
 
 “All of us were reborn on October 2. And on that day we also decided how we are all going to die: 
fighting for genuine justice and democracy.” –Raúl Álvarez Garín of CNH306 
 
Examining the various forces radicalizing student activism helps to advance the current 
historiography of the student movement by complicating attempts to define youth activism as 
apolitical. Donald Mabry and Evelyn Stevens attribute student activism to educational matters, 
and accordingly conclude that the movement was self-interested rather than political. However, 
closer examinations of student discontent demonstrate that educational concerns reflect a deep 
engagement with society. Students called for a reformed educational system that served a public 
good. They envisioned a university experience that would allow them to develop into informed 
political actors that could contribute to development and Mexican society. Further, by 
historicizing the movement, this study illustrates that students were mobilized by more 
traditional political concerns as well, including economic policy and government organization. 
Sources illustrate that students actively critiqued and vocalized their own opinions concerning 
course content, employment, and economic inequality, challenging Jermi Suri’s labeling of youth 
activism as an unauthentic, regurgitation of intellectual thought.  
Recognizing the political nature of the movement reveals that the active participation of 
students within Mexican society was more than a simple “vogue” or self-interested endeavor. 
Students analyzed and critiqued their communities and the nation, proposed reforms, and 
organized to demand change. However, focusing exclusively on the political character obscures a 
complete understanding of student activism. Therefore it is equally important to acknowledge the 
cultural elements as well. Eric Zolov in his book, Refried Elvis: The Rise of Mexican 
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Counterculture, suggests that the movement had two distinct phases of political and cultural 
participation, arguing that after the massacre students joined the counterculture as a means of 
expressing discontent. Without the opportunity for public protest and political debate, precluded 
by the massacre’s dismantling of the movement, students participated in the “hippie” culture, 
partaking in rock n’ roll, drug use, and sexual freedom. Zolov’s study is informative in that he 
positions the student movement within the transnational experience of the 1960’s counterculture. 
However, rather than delineating between a political and cultural period of activism, the history 
of the student movement can be improved by understanding cultural challenges to social values 
posed by Mexico’s youth, as constituting an element of a larger political project in and of itself. 
A useful example of this is reflected in the participation of women within the counterculture.  
Female participation in the counterculture symbolizes more than simply dismissing 
conservative attire for the newly popular miniskirt and increased sexual liberalization. Rather, 
the contribution of women represents an important political project. Traditionally Mexican 
women had been excluded from the political sphere and lived a subordinate position to the male 
patriarch. However, with the international influence of the feminist movement of the 1960s, 
Mexican women joined the ranks of the student movement and the counterculture more 
broadly.307 In an essay “Defining the Space of Mexico ’68: Heroic Masculinity in the Prison and 
‘Women’ in the Streets,” Lessie Jo Frazier and Deborah Cohen interviewed numerous women 
about their experiences within the movement. Angélica Tirado from the department of 
Philosophy explained that participation in the movement was intended to alter relationships in 
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their everyday life, particularly within the family and relationships between men and women.308 
She elaborated, “We started to question institutions and our own sexual roles.”309 Thus, women 
were not just radicalized by the concerns of the student movement, but their radicalization also 
embodied a greater political project in demanding the right to be political actors, and the right to 
challenge male dominance and gender norms.310     
Considering the role of women within Mexico’s youth movement illustrates that cultural 
and political realms are often difficult to separate. Individuals employ cultural expression as a 
form of political critique, while at the same time the political environment can shape culture 
expression.311 Ultimately, the political-cultural dichotomy dominating the historiography of the 
student youth movement obscures the complex nature of student activism. The purpose of this 
study has been to expand the history of the student youth movement by moving beyond this 
dichotomy and historicizing student activism. Historicization unveils a variety of radicalizing 
forces within this political project, stemming from economic, social, and political concerns, 
driving students to demand a developed and democratic society that benefited all Mexicans.  
This realization dismisses activism as being purely political or cultural. Thus, when studying 
popular movements, historians must be attentive to the various factors radicalizing activism so as 
not to dilute the diversity of voices within the movement.   
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I  Tracing the Parallels Between Contemporary Protest and the Student Youth Movement 
Recently in the United States a burgeoning mass movement has begun to take shape, 
spreading across the country and globally. This movement, referred to as “Occupy Wall Street,” 
reflects a growing disaffection with economic inequality and American corporatism. Observers 
seeking to comprehend the essence of this political activism should view the current movement 
in relation to México’s student youth movement during the 1960s. Together the demands of both 
of these movements for the reprioritization of business interests, political representation, and the 
distribution of wealth, call attention to the continual deterioration in the standard of living that 
results from a capitalist from of economic development.  
One of the primary radicalizing forces behind student activism during the 1960s was the 
government’s preoccupation with economic development. Students challenged the prioritization 
of domestic and foreign business interests above the needs of the ordinary Mexican people. 
Students condemned industrial development practices that increased efficiency and profits, often 
foreign, while failing to generate jobs for Mexican workers. Economic influence on university 
curriculum equally motivated students to demand courses that both created a productive 
workforce and met the diverse interests of the student body. Student activists felt that democratic 
representation and the formation of political organizations to represent the interests of the masses 
were essential for challenging México’s single-party system and ensure that business interests 
would not continue to guide the direction of México alone.  
Nearly fifty years after México’s student movement, “Occupy Wall Street” activists are 
echoing similar concerns. The removal of corporate influence is the foremost radicalizing force 
in the U.S. today. Disenchantment with economic practices instituted for the benefit of big 
business is often being articulated in the demand for the regulation of “free trade” economics. 
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Many are angered at the exportation of American jobs during a time of such high unemployment. 
These practices, according to some activists, allow for corporations to generate larger profits 
from cheap foreign labor at the expense of working class needs in the U.S. People are demanding 
business operations that meet the needs of domestic concerns rather then simply for the 
generation of economic gains for the few, reflecting a similar critique voiced by Mexican 
students in the 1960s. 
Activists are also demanding an end to the practice of corporate personhood which grants 
corporations the legal status of a “person.” Originally intended to aid in contract agreements and 
allow for corporations to be persecuted for crimes they commit, activists contend corporate 
personhood has allowed for the corruption of the 14th amendment of the U.S. constitution. Most 
troubling, in the recent Supreme Court ruling, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 
corporations have been granted the right to contribute an unlimited amount of funds towards 
political campaigns. Similar to student condemnation in the 1960s, the unrestrained influence of 
business interests secured through campaign contributions stands to further diminish the 
representation of ordinary people in the U.S. More politicians are accepting corporate 
contributions to maintain a competitive stance, thus entangling their political careers with 
corporate obligations. The undeniable outcome of such a system will be the continual 
prioritization of business interests, leaving the working class unrepresented. 
Demands for distribution of wealth constitute another important radicalizing force among 
Mexican youth and activists today. Students in México condemned unfair taxation and low 
wages for contributing to a diminished standard of living for México’s masses. Tax reform and 
the removal of foreign influence in México, students asserted, was necessary to distribute wealth 
and provide revenue for social spending in order to improve social conditions within the country. 
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A gross concentration of wealth has equally radicalized the Occupy Wall Street movement. In 
order to encourage a more equitable distribution of wealth, protesters are demanding progressive 
taxation. Reminiscent of México’s youth, activists desire tax rates that increase as the amount 
taxed increases in an effort to shift the tax burden from the lower classes to the wealthy. 
Correspondingly, the current movement is calling for the elimination of tax loopholes that allow 
corporations to evade taxation. A more just system of taxation, as outlined by activists, would 
allow for the generation of greater revenues, decrease budget deficits, and augment social 
spending.     
Disgruntled with the direction of our nation and lacking political avenues to effect 
change, North Americans have resorted to public protest to demand a government responsive to 
the needs of the people. The direction of this movement is not entirely foreseeable as activists 
and observers struggle to determine how the movement should be presented. Commentators are 
calling for the formation of a unified voice and single overarching goal. However, taken from the 
example of the student youth movement in México we should be cautious of attempting to 
confine current activism within the boundaries of a single message. The reoccurring assertion 
that student protest was purely in response to police brutality creates an illusion of uniformity 
when, in fact, students were radicalized by a diversity of interests. For that reason, current 
activists must resist attempts to confine their concerns to a single demand, and support 
heterogeneity within the movement.  
 Ultimately, the demands of México’s student activists and the current Occupy 
Wall Street movement have much in common. The parallels between the two movements 
illustrate the continuous impact of the capitalist system on the people and the formation 
of class identity. To return once again to the words of Gonzales Casanova, 
  The self adjusting mechanism which characterized the European and American 
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development of capitalist countries is aided by democratic interplay and democratic 
organization of trade unions, and it forces the state and the entrepreneurs to make more 
and greater concessions to the masses to make social investments to increase salaries to 
enact tax laws that will bring about dynamic egalitarianism. In México this mechanism 
does not operate with the same efficiency. Government decisions regarding development 
are made on the basis of a far more limited view of equality, which is, in fact, a view far 
closer to inequality.312  
According to Gonzales Casanova inequality is not an inevitable product of a capitalist system. 
Rather, when trade unions and other egalitarian measures are in existence, the emergence of an 
exploited class can be evaded. The growth of inequality in México, then, was the result of the 
inability of the Mexican government to balance capitalist development with democratic 
principles. Unfortunately, as the current movement illustrates, the United States exhibits the 
same failures that Gonzales Casanova attributes to the Mexican government. Guided by business 
interests and global market competition, the U.S. appears to be gradually moving away from 
democratic mechanisms to foster an economy deeply weakened by growing inequality. The 
current world condition leaves observers to question if capitalism and inequality are mutually 
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